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Abstract
This work introduces a new model to investigate the efficiency and evolution of networks of firms
exchanging knowledge in R&D partnerships. We first examine the efficiency of a given network
structure from the point of view of maximizing total profits in the industry. We show that the ef-
ficient network structure depends on the marginal cost of collaboration. When the marginal cost
is low, the complete graph is efficient. However, a high marginal cost implies that the efficient net-
work is sparser and has a core-periphery structure. Next, we examine the evolution of the network
structure when the decision on collaborating partners is decentralized. We show the existence of
multiple equilibrium structures which are in general inefficient. This is due to (i) the path depen-
dent character of the partner selection process, (ii) the presence of knowledge externalities and (iii)
the presence of severance costs involved in link deletion. Finally, we study the properties of the
emerging equilibrium networks and we show that they are coherent with the stylized facts on R&D
networks.
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1. Introduction
R&D partnerships have become a widespread phenomenon characterizing technologi-
cal dynamics, especially in industries (28), with rapid technological development such as,
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for instance, the pharmaceutical, chemical and computer industries (see 2; 29; 45; 47). In
those industries, firms have become more specialized on specific domains of a technology
and they tend to rely on knowledge transfers from other firms, which are specialized in
different domains, in order to combine complementary domains of knowledge for produc-
tion (2; 46).
In this paper, we build a model in which firms innovate by recombining their knowledge
with that of other firms in the industry, via a network of costly R&D collaborations.
Within this framework, we first study the efficiency of a given network structure in
terms of maximization of total profits in the industry. We characterize the topology of
the efficient structure for any level of the marginal cost of collaborations in the relevant
range. Next, we study the emergence of pairwise stable structures by employing the
notion of improving path (cf. 36), and assuming that link deletion is subject to severance
costs. We show that if the cost of a collaboration is positive, there exist multiple stable
structures for any given level of link severance costs. In addition, we study the relation
between network stability and efficiency. Finally, we investigate equilibrium selection
under a two-sided myopic link dynamics and we show that the model is able to generate
stable structures that match the properties of empirically observed R&D networks.
Our research is motivated by two different, albeit related, streams of literature on
R&D networks. On the one hand, the increasing importance of R&D partnerships has
spurred research, both theoretical and empirical, on the consequences of a given structure
of the R&D network for technology innovation and diffusion (see among many others
2; 13; 14; 40). To this regard, an important and still unsettled debate concerns the relation
between the position of a firm in the network and its performance, and, in particular,
whether a densely interconnected network is more conducive to knowledge diffusion and
innovation than a network with structural holes (i.e. displaying the presence of hubs
indirectly connecting many firms which have no direct link across them). Indeed, clusters
of densely and directly connected firms might be seen as fostering collaboration efforts
among participants by generating trust and punishment of opportunistic behaviors, and
a common language and problem solving heuristics (see e.g. 2; 11; 14; Walker et al.).
Conversely, by creating a structural hole in the network firms may have access to different
sources of knowledge spillovers at the same time economizing on the costs of direct
collaborations (cf. 9; 23; 51).
On the other hand, another body of contributions has investigated the salient features
of empirically observed R&D networks (see e.g. 2; 21; 29; 32; 47; 50). These empiri-
cal studies have identified three main structural properties of innovation networks that
look invariant across the different industries examined: (i) Networks are sparse, that is,
from all possible connections between firms, only a small subset is realized. (ii) Networks
are highly clustered, that is, they are locally dense. In clusters firms are closely inter-
connected but between different clusters there exist only a few connections. (iii) The
distribution of links over the firms tends to be highly heterogeneous with only few firms
being connected to many others. Following this wave of empirical research, theoretical
models have explored the emergence of R&D networks in a framework with firms being
allowed to form any arbitrary pattern of bilateral R&D agreements (see 24; 25, for an
equilibrium approach, and Cowan et al., 2006, for an agent-based approach) . However,
these models lead to network structures that are too simple to account for the stylized
facts listed above.
Our paper contributes to the foregoing literature along several dimensions. First, we
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show that the network structure maximizing industry welfare (measured as the sum of
firms’ profits) is a function of the marginal cost of collaborations. In particular, when
the marginal cost is low the complete graph - i.e. the one maximizing the number of
direct ties - is the most efficient. As the marginal costs increase, it is efficient for the
industry to organize into networks (the class of nested-split graphs, see Definition 2 and
Proposition 3) having a core-periphery structure. More precisely, such networks display
the presence of hubs, indirectly linking cliques of firms to otherwise disconnected nodes
in the network. Second, and relatedly, we show that if collaboration costs and the size
of the industry are large enough, the efficient structure for the industry is characterized
by significant inequality in profits across firms. In particular, firms having less (more)
direct connections are also the ones displaying higher (lower) profits. In addition, profits
inequality increases both in the number of firms and in the marginal cost of collaboration.
Third, we study the relation between efficiency and equilibrium networks in our model.
We show that multiple equilibrium structures for the same level of collaboration costs do
arise in our model. In particular, we demonstrate that, for the same level of collaboration
cost, both the spanning star (i.e. the star encompassing all nodes in the network), as well
as the graph composed by disconnected cliques of the same size are possible equilibrium
networks. The existence of multiple equilibria implies that efficiency is not necessarily
met by equilibrium structures in our model. In addition, we identify the conditions on
industry size and collaboration costs under which the efficient network never belongs to
the set of possible equilibria. Finally, we study the properties of equilibrium structures in
our model and we compare them with those of empirical R&D networks. More precisely
we investigate equilibrium selection under a two-sided link formation/deletion (see 55)
in which agents are stochastically selected to revise their collaboration strategies. In this
dynamics, firms decide to form a link if the link did not exist before and the link is
beneficial to both of them, and decide to delete a link if the link existed before and
deletion is beneficial to at least one of the agents selected. We show that under this
dynamics the model is able to select equilibrium structures matching the stylized facts
of empirical R&D networks.
As we mentioned above, the possibility of recombining different knowledge stocks to
introduce innovations in the industry is the rationale for R&D collaborations in our model
(see 2; 38; 46; 58). We formalize this idea by assuming that the arrival rate of innovations
is proportional to the growth rate in the knowledge stock of the firm, and that firm’s
knowledge growth is a linear combination of the idiosyncratic knowledge stocks of the
firm and the knowledge of its R&D partners. In the model, firm’s expected profits are
a linear function of the expected number of innovations per period and of the costs
of R&D collaborations. Each R&D collaboration requires a fixed investment over each
period. Total costs of collaboration are thus proportional to the number of collaborations
(the degree) of the firm. Moreover, if the period over which collaborations are evaluated is
long enough, the expected number of innovations per period turns out to be proportional
to the largest eigenvalue of the matrix associated with the connected component to which
the firm belongs. This has several implications. First, as the largest eigenvalue is the same
for all firms in the same component, the formation/deletion of a collaboration by a firm
has a strong non-rival external effect on all its direct and indirect neighbors. Second, the
magnitude of the change in eigenvalue, resulting from creating/severing a collaboration,
varies with the topology of the network and the position of the two firms involved in
the collaboration, thus implying a strong path-dependent character of partner’s choice
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decisions. Finally, it can be shown that the largest eigenvalue is related to the number
of all walks connecting firms in a given component.
Our model can be related to the models in the network formation literature in which
agents face a trade-off between the benefit they get from accessing the network and the
cost of forming links with other agents (see e.g. 4; 10; 31; 37; 56). To this regard, our
model shares many similarities and differences with the “Connections” model introduced
in (37) and with the linear “Two-Way Flow” model without decay introduced in (4). For
instance, similar to both models, the benefit an agent receives from the network derives
also from indirect connections. In addition, such a benefit is non-rival 1 (see in particular
Eq. (10) and discussion thereafter). However, differently from both models, link deletion
involves severance costs. Furthermore, differently from the Jackson and Wolinsky’s model
the benefit the agent receives from the network does not depends only on the shortest
path existing between the agent and its direct and indirect neighbours but it accounts
for all possible walks existing among them. Next, differently from the Bala and Goyal’s
linear model, link-formation is two-sided . Another difference is that, the utility of the
agent does not depend only on the number of direct and indirect neighbours that can be
reached by the agent with its existing connections, but also on how each neighbour can be
reached. Incorporating all walks and severance costs in the network formation process has
several implications also for the results obtained. First, as efficiency is concerned, similar
to the Jackson and Wolinsky’s model (and differently from the Bala and Goyal’s model)
we obtain that the complete graph and the empty graph are efficient for, respectively,
low and high values of the marginal cost of link formation. By contrast, differently from
both models, first, the efficient graph for intermediate levels of the marginal cost of
collaboration (i.e. the nested-split graph), is in general not minimally connected (i.e. more
than one path exists between any two agents in the efficient graph). Second, stable graphs
are not necessarily connected as it can consists of several disconnected components.
Similar to both models, we obtain the spanning star as possible equilibrium network for
intermediate levels of the marginal cost of collaboration. However, differently from both
models, this equilibrium coexists with the equilibrium consisting of the class of graphs
composed of disconnected cliques of the same size.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the description of the model,
starting with the definition of the network of R&D collaborations across firms, and then
moving to explain how firms profit from R&D collaborations, and the relations between
our model and the others proposed in the literature. Section 3 is devoted to the analysis
of the efficiency of R&D network structures and to the relation between efficiency and
firms’ profits inequality. Network dynamics, the emergence of equilibrium networks and
their properties are analyzed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes. All proofs can be
found in the Appendix.
2. The Model
We consider an industry in which firms engage in pairwise R&D collaborations with
other firms. Collaborations allows the growth of knowledge within the firm and an in-
crease in the probability to introduce innovations that yield profits to the firm. We first
1 See Vega-Redondo and Goyal (56) for a model where benefits from indirect connections are non-rival.
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define the network of R&D collaborations. Next, we characterize how the R&D network
influences knowledge growth, innovation and the profits of the firms. Finally, we briefly
discuss the relations between our model and the relevant literature.
2.1. The Network
Consider an industry populated by N firms. The network 2 G is the pair (N,E) con-
sisting of the set of nodes N(G) = {1, ..., n}, n > 1, representing the firms and a set
of edges E(G), representing the R&D collaborations among the firms 3 (for simplicity
we may just write N and E where it is obvious to which network G the sets refer). An
edge ij ∈ E, represents the existence of an R&D collaboration between firm i and j. A
subgraph of G is a pair G′ = (N ′, E′) such that N ′ ⊆ N , E′ ⊆ E. The number of nodes
is |N | = n and the number of edges |E| = m. A complete graph Kn is a graph in which
all n nodes are pairwise adjacent. The graph in which no pair of nodes is adjacent is the
empty graph K¯n. A clique Kn′ , n′ ≤ n, is a complete subgraph of the network G. An
independent set K¯n′ is a clique in which all n′ nodes are not pairwise adjacent.
The neighborhood of i is the set Ni = {j ∈ N : ij ∈ E}. The degree of a node i in
G, written by di, is the number of edges incident to i. Clearly, di = |Ni|. The maximum
degree is ∆(G) and the minimum degree is δ(G). The clustering coefficient Ci for firm i
is the proportion of links between the firms within its neighborhood Ni divided by the
number of links that could possibly exist between them, i.e.
Ci = 2|{jk : j, k ∈ Ni ∧ jk ∈ E}|
di(di − 1) . (1)
The total clustering coefficient is the sum of the clustering coefficients for each firm,
C =∑ni=1 Ci.
A walk Wk of length k connecting firm i1 and ik is a sequence of firms (i1, i2, ..., ik) such
that i1i2, i2i3, ..., ik−1ik ∈ E. A walk is closed if the first and last firm in the sequence
are the same, and open if they are different. A path is an open walk in which no firm is
visited twice. A closed path encompassing n nodes is a cycle, denoted by Cn.
A connected component in G is a maximal set of firms such that there exists a path
between any two of them. We will say that two components are disconnected if there is
no path between them. A connected graph is a graph consisting of only one connected
component.
Let A(G) be the symmetric n × n adjacency matrix of the R&D network G. The
element aij ∈ {0, 1} indicates if there exists a link between firm i and j such that aij = 1
if ij ∈ E and aij = 0 if ij /∈ E. The eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix A are the
numbers λ such that Ax = λx has a nonzero solution vector, which is an eigenvector
associated with λ. The term λPF denotes the largest real eigenvalue of A (the Perron-
Frobenius eigenvalue, cf. 34; 52), i.e. all eigenvalues λ of A(G) satisfy |λ| ≤ λPF and
there exists an associated nonnegative eigenvector v ≥ 0 such that Av = λPFv. For a
connected graph G the adjacency matrix A(G) has a unique largest real eigenvalue λPF
and a positive associated eigenvector v > 0.
2 In this paper we will use the terms graph and network interchangeably. The same holds for links and
edges.
3 We consider undirected graphs only.
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Let A(G) be the symmetric n × n adjacency matrix of the R&D network G. The
element aij ∈ {0, 1} indicates if there exists a link between agent i and j such that
aij = 1 if ij ∈ E and aij = 0 if ij /∈ E. The eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix A are
the numbers λ such that Ax = λx has a nonzero solution vector, which is an eigenvector
associated with λ. The term λPF denotes the largest real eigenvalue of A (the Perron-
Frobenius eigenvalue, cf. 34; 52), i.e. all eigenvalues λ of A(G) satisfy |λ| ≤ λPF and
there exists an associated nonnegative eigenvector v ≥ 0 such that Av = λPFv. For a
connected graph G the adjacency matrix A(G) has a unique largest real eigenvalue λPF
and a positive associated eigenvector v > 0.
Finally, for a graph with n nodes there are
(n
2
)
possible links. We denote with G(n, p)
the random graph with n nodes, in which each of the possible links occurs independently
with probability p. Similarly, G(n,m) is the random graph with n nodes and m edges.
2.2. Innovation and Profits from R&D Collaborations
Firms exploit R&D collaborations to introduce innovations in the industry. Decisions
over R&D partners are taken at discrete times t = T, 2T, 3T, ... where the length of
a period is given by T > 0. Innovations are introduced during each period (t, t + T ].
The rewards from each innovation are assumed to be appropriable so that an innovation
returns a value equal to the constant V > 0. Following the theoretical literature on
innovation and endogenous technical change (see e.g. 1; 41; 48; 49; 60), we assume that
the introduction of innovations is governed by a non-homogeneous Poisson process with
arrival rate equal to hi(τ), where τ ≥ 0 indicates the time variable within a period.
Thus, the probability that an innovation is introduced by firm i in the interval dτ , is
equal to hi(τ)dτ . Moreover we assume that, for any firm i, the arrival rate of innovations
is proportional to the growth rate ρi(τ) of knowledge 4
hi(τ) = bρi(τ), b > 0. (2)
In other words, the higher the growth rate of new ideas, the more likely it is that the firm
will be able to innovate. This assumption is tantamount to say that it is the growth (flow)
of knowledge of a firm that makes it more innovative, rather than the stock of knowledge
accumulated by the firm over time. Expected revenues of firm i in a period (t, t+ T ] are
given by the value V of each innovation times the expected number of innovations in the
period. Note that in Equation (2) the innovation process starts anew at the beginning of
every period (t, t + T ], taking as initial condition the stock of knowledge at the end of
the previous period (t−1, t−1+T ]. In addition, let us set τ ∈ (0, T ]. From Equation (2)
the expected number of innovations accumulated in a period (t, t+T ] can be written as:∫ T
0
hi(τ)dτ = b
∫ T
0
ρi(τ)dτ. (3)
In turn, the growth rate of knowledge is affected by the network of collaborations as
follows. In each period (t, t+T ], new knowledge is generated by recombining the existing
knowledge stocks of firms in the economy via the existing network of R&D collaborations
4 Note that b has the dimension of an inverse time.
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(see 38; 43; 58). More precisely, let us denote by xi(τ) the stock of knowledge of firm i
at time τ ∈ (t, t+ T ]. Then new knowledge within firm i is generated according to:
x˙i(τ) =
n∑
j=1
aij(t)xj(τ), (4)
where aij(t) are the elements of the adjacency matrix A(G(t)) (defined in Section 2.1)
corresponding to the network of R&D collaborations 5 . In vector-matrix notation Equa-
tion (4) reads x˙(τ) = A(G(t))x(τ). Note also that in Equation (4) for non-negative initial
values of x(0) ≥ 0, we have that x˙(τ) ≥ 0 as well as x(τ) ≥ 0.
The growth rate of knowledge of firm i, ρi(τ) = x˙i(τ)/xi(τ), is directly affected by the
growth rate of knowledge of its neighbors, whose growth rate is affected by the growth
rate of their neighbors, and so on. Therefore, Equation 4 implies that the topology of
the whole network of R&D collaborations (including all direct and indirect paths along
which knowledge can flow between the firms), influences the innovation process within
the firm.
Collaborations also imply a cost for the firms. Within a period (t, t + T ] each collab-
oration involves a cost per unit of time equal to c˜. Moreover, we assume that firms are
risk-neutral. Finally, if we denote by Gi(t) the connected component to which firm i
belongs in the period, then expected profits for the firm at the beginning of the period
can be written as:
p˜ii(Gi(t), c, t) = bV
∫ T
0
ρi(τ)dτ − c˜T di(t), (5)
where di(t) is the degree of the firm at time t and during the period.
The timing of events in each period (t, t + T ] runs as follows: at the beginning t of
the period the network of R&D collaborations is determined (only one link is added
or removed at time t), based on the expected profits and remains fixed throughout the
period (t, t + T ]. During the period (t, t + T ], firms recombine their knowledge stocks
through the network while they also bear the costs of their collaborations. As a result,
innovations are introduced and the rents accrue to the firm.
The expression for expected profits in Eq. (5) can be directly related to the structure of
the network of collaborations. For this purpose, the next Proposition establishes a relation
between, on one hand, the asymptotic growth rate of ideas, the asymptotic relative stock
of knowledge and the rate of convergence, and, on the other hand, the eigenvalues and
eigenvectors of the adjacency matrix A(Gi(t)) of the connected component of firm i.
Proposition 1 Consider the eigenvalues λPF = λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ ... ≥ λn associated with the
adjacency matrix A(Gi(t)) of the connected component Gi(t) of firm i ∈ N(Gi(t)). Then
the following results hold:
(i) The asymptotic knowledge growth rate of a firm i is constant and equal to the largest
real eigenvalue (Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue) of the adjacency matrix A(Gi(t))
lim
τ→∞ ρi(τ) = λPF(Gi(t)). (6)
The rate of convergence is O (e−[λPF(Gi(t))−λ2(Gi(t))]τ) as τ →∞.
5 In Equation (4) we are assuming the process of creation of ideas at the firm level is cumulative, in
that larger knowledge stocks (of the firm and of its collaborators) lead to higher knowledge growth. This
property of knowledge dynamics has often been emphasized in innovation studies (see e.g. 20).
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(ii) The asymptotic value of a firm i’s relative knowledge stock equals the element vi of
the eigenvector associated with λPF(Gi(t))
lim
τ→∞
xi(τ)∑n
j=1 xj(τ)
= vi. (7)
Point (i) of the above Proposition states that the knowledge dynamics defined in Equation
(4) converges, for a given R&D network, to a steady state characterized by a constant
growth rate of ideas. In addition, such constant growth rate depends on the topology
of the connected component which the firm belongs to (through the largest eigenvalue
λPF (Gi(t))). This implies that, in the steady state, the arrival rate of an innovation is
constant and equal to bλPF . Moreover, point (ii) implies that the topology of the con-
nected component Gi(t) determines the distribution of relative values of the knowledge
stocks of firms in the same component. Finally, the rate of convergence to the steady
state is determined by the eigenvalues of 6 of A(Gi).
An important assumption of our model is that the growth of knowledge is much faster
than the formation of R&D collaborations. This is equivalent to saying that τ is measured
in time units much smaller than those used to measure t. In other words, t = kτ , with k
large. Under this assumption, the expected number of innovations per unit of time can
be approximated (taking the limit k → ∞) with the largest real eigenvalue of a firm’s
connected component.
Corollary 1 The expected number of innovations of firm i per unit of time in a period
(t, t + T ] tends to the largest real eigenvalue of firm i’s connected component Gi.
lim
k→∞
1
kT
∫ kT
0
ρi(τ)dτ = λPF(Gi(t)). (8)
Expected profits of the firm at beginning of the period (t, t+ T ] can now be written as
p˜ii(Gi(t), c, t) = bλPF(Gi(t))V T − c˜di(t)T. (9)
Applying an affine transformation to the above equation, we finally obtain expected
profits per unit of time in the period between t and t + T ,
pii(Gi(t), c, t) = λPF(Gi(t))− cdi(t), (10)
where c = c˜bV is the marginal cost of link formation (rescaled by the factor 1/bV )
7 .
Since in Equation (10) the largest eigenvalue λPF(Gi(t)) is the same for all firms in
the same connected component, the expected revenues from R&D collaborations will be
the same for all the members of Gi. Nonetheless, profits from R&D collaborations vary,
in general, across firms, since each firm may have a different number of collaborations.
The following Lemma 8 characterizes the relation between the largest eigenvalue of a
connected component and the creation or removal of R&D collaborations.
6 In general, the convergence in a connected component to its largest real eigenvalue is always guar-
anteed. In addition, more dense networks are characterized by a faster convergence (see the proof of
Proposition (1) in the Appendix). However, the convergence can be slow for sparse networks and par-
ticular network topologies. For a recent application and discussion of the convergence properties of the
social network matrix see (35).
7 The introduction of linear and homogeneous in-house R&D activities in Equation (4) for the dynamics
of knowledge stocks would not alter the functional form of profits (up to a constant).
8 A proof of the foregoing Lemma can be found in (16).
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Lemma 1 Denote G′ = (N ′, E′) the graph obtained from the connected graph G =
(N,E) by the addition or removal of an edge. Then
(i) λPF(G′) ≥ λPF(G) if ij /∈ E and λPF(G′) ≤ λPF(G) if ij ∈ E.
(ii) λPF(G′) ≤ λPF(Kn) = n− 1.
(iii) |λPF(G′)− λPF(G)| ≤ 1
Thus, the largest real eigenvalue in a component is a non decreasing function of the
number of links. In addition, it is a bounded function, since its value can never be
higher than the one associated with the complete graph Kn. Finally, the change in
the eigenvalue is itself a bounded function, since its value must be less than one. The
preceding observations deliver two central properties of the model.
First, since the probability of innovation is the same for all the firms in a given con-
nected component and it is affected by each link, the creation (deletion) of a collaboration
by one firm has a positive (negative) non-rival external effect on all its direct and indirect
neighbors in the component. As we will see in Section 4, this property is at the origin of
the fact that the network can evolve into equilibria that are socially inefficient.
Second, the marginal revenue from R&D collaborations is always a positive (albeit
bounded) function of the number of links. This means that the creation (deletion) of a
new R&D collaboration increases (decreases) the probability of innovation and thus the
expected revenue. Moreover, the revenue itself is a bounded function of the number of
links. The last property does not imply that the revenue is also a concave function of
the number of links 9 . However, as we will show in Section 4, it implies that, as the
network grows in the number of links, the highest marginal revenue that - for a given
network - can actually be obtained from the creation of a new link or from the removal
of an existing link can become very small. In turns out that, when the highest marginal
revenue from a collaboration that can be obtained is smaller than the marginal cost of
collaboration, the network reaches an equilibrium, and this may happen well before the
network has grown to a fully connected graph.
.
2.3. Relation to the Literature
The profit Equation (10) can be compared to other similar utility functions in the
literature that feature a dependence on the position of a firm in the network. For instance,
the utility function proposed in the “connections model” in (37) is given by
ui =
n∑
j=1
δd(i,j) − cdi, (11)
where 0 < δ < 1 and d(i, j) is the length of the shortest path from node i to node j.
The difference between the profit function in (10) and the utility function in (11)
becomes apparent in the benefit term. While Equation (11) considers the shortest path
between firm i and j only, our model instead takes into account all possible walks from
firm i to the other firms in the connected component 10 Recall that, in our model, a walk
9 Incidentally, note that λPF is not even determined as a function of m, because, for a given m, there
are many different ways to arrange the links among the nodes, resulting in different values of λPF).
10 It has been argued that in several settings paths that are not the shortest may have a big impact on
the information that is transmitted from one agent to another (see e.g. 54; 57).
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represents a sequence of recombination of the knowledge of the firms along that walk. Not
any recombination of knowledge might translate into a successful innovation. However,
the more walks there are in the component, the higher is the number of possible knowledge
recombinations available. It turns out that the likelihood for a successful innovation is
increased. Indeed, the largest eigenvalue λPF(Gi) of the adjacency matrix of a connected
component Gi, is related to the number of possible walks in that component (more
precisely, the growth rate in the number of walks of length k tends to λPF(Gi); this
property has been further elaborated in Ko¨nig et al. (39)). Thus, the larger is λPF(Gi),
the larger is the number of possible knowledge recombinations via direct and indirect
R&D collaborations. From Equation (10) we can conclude that profits of firm i grow
with the number of walks in the connected component which firm i belongs to. On the
other hand, profits decrease with the degree di of the firm. Therefore, with our profit
function it is best for a firm to be able to reach the other firms through many walks
but to have not too many links to pay for. This observation becomes apparent if one
considers the following simple example. The revenues of the hub in a star K1,n−1 and a
node in a complete graph Kn in Equation (11) are identical, because the shortest paths
to all the other nodes are one link long in both cases. This is not the case in our model
where these two graphs generate very different revenues. A node in the complete graph
can reach the other nodes through many different paths and this generates a much higher
revenue than the one of the hub in a star.
In their linear “Two-Way Flow” model Bala and Goyal (4) introduce a utility function
of the form:
ui = |Gi|− cdi, (12)
where |Gi| is the size of the connected component of firm i ∈ N(Gi). This means that the
utility of firm i grows with the number of all firms in the network who can be reached by
firm i across at least one path. The number of links and the number of paths between i
and the other firms do not matter because the benefit flow across the network is assumed
to be independent of its topology. In contrast, in our model the topological properties
of the component the firm belongs to are critical for the profits of the firm. Consider
the following simple examples. According to Equation (12), revenues for a firm in the
complete graph Kn, in the clique K1,n−1 and in the cycle Cn, are identical. However,
as one can see from Table (1), in our model for the same number of collaborations the
revenues a firm earns from being part of a clique Kn are higher than in a star K1,n−1,
which in turn are higher than in a cycle Cn. This ranking can be understood if one
considers the possible walks in these graphs. The number of walks is highest in the
complete graph Kn while it is smallest in the cycle Cn (that contains only one walk).
While all these graphs encompass the same number of firms, they differ significantly in
the way the links are arranged among the firms.
3. Efficiency
In the model presented in the previous Section, firms face a trade-off between increasing
the probability to innovate by forming R&D collaborations and the cost of sharing knowl-
edge with other firms in the industry. In this Section we investigate how this trade-off
can be managed in order to yield the best outcome from the industry point of view. First,
we show that there exists an interval of the marginal cost of link formation, c ∈ [0, 1],
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in which the network that maximizes social welfare, that is the efficient graph, is a con-
nected graph. We will show in Section 4 that this interval is the one of main interest
since for values above this interval, c > 1, firms do not have the incentive to form any
additional collaboration. Therefore, we restrict our attention to values of cost in this
interval.
We then investigate the topology of the efficient graph, and we show that it belongs
to a well defined class of connected graphs, the “nested split graphs”. In particular, for
c small enough, the efficient graph is the complete graph. On the other hand, for higher
values of c and a larger number of firms, the efficient graph is sparser and characterized
by degree heterogeneity. Finally, we show that at higher values of cost, the efficient graph
is characterized by a significant degree of inequality in profits.
3.1. Efficient Networks
Following (37), we define social welfare as the sum of firms’ individual profits
Π(G, c) =
∑n
i=1 pii(Gi)
=
∑n
i=1 (λPF(Gi)− cdi)
=
∑n
i=1 λPF(Gi)− 2mc.
(13)
We are interested in the solution of the following social planner’s problem. Let G(n)
denote the set of all possible graphs with n nodes. For a given value of cost c, the social
planner’s solution is given by
G∗ = argmax
G∈G(n)
Π(G, c). (14)
A graph G∗ solving the maximization problem (14), will be denoted as “efficient”.
In order to solve this problem we begin by identifying an interval for the marginal
costs c in which social welfare is increased by connecting two disconnected components
of the network. The following Lemma can be stated.
Lemma 2 Consider a graph G consisting of two disconnected components G1 and G2,
with n1, n2 nodes, m1, m2 edges, eigenvalues λPF(G1), λPF(G2) and total profits Π(G1) =
n1λPF(G1)−2m1c, Π(G2) = n2λPF(G2)−2m2c. We further assume that c ∈ [0, 1]. Then
there exists a connected graph G′ with n = n1 + n2 nodes that has higher total profits
Π(G′) ≥ Π(G) = Π(G1) +Π(G2).
Thus, for c ∈ [0, 1], connecting two previously disconnected components of the graph
yields total profits larger than the respective total profits of the disconnected components.
From this it follows immediately that the efficient network is connected.
Proposition 2 Let H(n,m) denote the set of connected graphs having n nodes and m
links. If c ∈ [0, 1] then G∗ ∈ H(n,m).
This means that, in order to guarantee an efficient knowledge production in the economy,
each firm must have (direct or indirect) access to the knowledge of all other firms in
the industry. Since the efficient graph is connected, the equation for total profits (13)
simplifies to
Π(G, c) = nλPF(G) − 2mc. (15)
This implies that, for any given values of n and m, the efficient graph is also the one
with maximal λPF. In other words, for c ∈ [0, 1], the efficient graph G∗ belongs to
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the set of connected graphs that maximize λPF(G), denoted by H∗(n,m). As a result,
the efficient graph belongs to a special class of graphs characterized by well defined
topological properties 11 . In order to fully describe these properties we first need to
introduce some basic definitions.
(8) show that the graphs in the set H∗(n,m) have a stepwise adjacency matrix A,
defined as follows:
Definition 1 In a stepwise matrix A, the elements aij satisfy the following condition.
If i < j and aij = 1, then ahk = 1 whenever h < k ≤ j and h ≤ i.
The above definition says that if the adjacency matrix has an element equal to one,
aij = 1, then also the element above in the matrix is one, ai,j−1 = 1, and the element to
the left in the matrix is one, ai−1,j = 1. Consequently, all the preceding elements to the
left and above are one. In this way, the one-elements are separated from the zero-elements
in the adjacency matrix along a line which has the form of a staircase function. This fact
has brought about the name stepwise matrix. An example of a stepwise matrix is shown
in Figure (1, right).
The graphs associated with a stepwise adjacency matrix are called nested split graphs
(3). However, before providing a formal definition, we consider an example of a connected
nested split graph and describe its structure with the help of the representation in Figure
(1, left). First, the nodes in a nested split graph can be partitioned in subsets of nodes with
different properties. In Figure (1, left) each circle represents a subset of nodes (and not an
actual node of the network). We denote the partition of the graph as P = U ∪ V , where
U and V consists respectively of subsets, U = {U1, U2, ..., Uk} and V = {V1, V2, ..., Vk}.
Recall the notation from Section 2.1 in which Kn denotes the complete graph with n
nodes and K¯n the empty graph with n isolated nodes. Then, for example, in Figure (1,
left) the sets are U1 = K2, U2 = K2 ∪K1 and U3 = K2 ∪K1 ∪K1 and V1 = K¯2, V2 = K¯2
and V3 = K¯2 respectively. Of course, K2 is simply a complete graph since it contains
only two nodes, and even more so K1.
The subsets Ui and Vi differ in the fact that in Ui all nodes are connected to each
other while in Vi there exist no links between the nodes. However, there exist also links
between nodes belonging to different subsets. In Figure (1, left) a line between two subsets
indicates that there exists a link between each node in one subset to each node in the
other subset. E.g. the nodes in K¯2 at the top right of the Figure are all connected to the
nodes in K2 at the top left. Additionally, the set U as well as any union of the subsets
in U form a complete subgraph or clique. Similarly, any union of the sets in V form an
independent set. Notice also that all the nodes in one set have the same degree. Next to
the sets in Figure (1, left) the degree of the nodes in a subset is indicated. The degree
of a node in a set can be easily derived from the adjacency matrix shown in Figure (1,
right) by counting the number of ones in a row corresponding to a particular node in
a set. E.g. the set K2, top left in the Figure, corresponds to two nodes whose links are
indicated in the first two rows of the adjacency matrix.
With the preceding discussion in mind, we can now give a more formal definition of a
nested split graph .
11The efficient networks are similar to those obtained in the model of (5). The authors show that their
model is a generalization of (25), which was introduced in the context of R&D networks. More precisely,
in (12) it is shown that the networks that maximize aggregate outcome and welfare coincide and are
given by the graphs with maximal eigenvalue.
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Fig. 1. Representation of a connected nested split graph (left) and the associated adjacency matrix
(right) with n = 10 nodes. A nested split graph can be partitioned into subsets of nodes with the same
degree (each subset is represented as circle, the degree d of the nodes in the subset is indicated). A
line connecting two subsets indicates that there exists an edge between each node in one set and all
the nodes in the other set.
Definition 2 ((18)) In a nested split graph, the set of nodes have a partition P =
U ∪ V1 ∪ ... ∪ Vk with the following properties:
(i) U induces a clique, and V induces an independent set.
(ii) U has subsets U1, ..., Uk such that U1 ⊃ ... ⊃ Uk and the neighborhood of each node
in Vi is Ui, (i = 1, ..., k).
If a nested split graph is connected we call it a connected nested split graph. The rep-
resentation and the adjacency matrix shown in Figure (1) actually show a connected
nested split graph. From the stepwise property of the adjacency matrix it follows that a
connected nested split graph contains at least one spanning star, that is there is at least
one node that is connected to all other nodes. This property can also be seen in Figure
(1), where the first row of the adjacency matrix that is entirely filled with ones indicates
the presence of a spanning star. We have shown that G∗ is connected and we know that
G∗ has a stepwise adjacency matrix. From the above discussion we can further conclude
that G∗ is a connected nested split graph and it contains at least one spanning star as a
subgraph.
The determination of the exact topology of G∗ in the class of connected split graphs
is still is still an unresolved research problem in Spectral Graph Theory (see 3) However,
it turns out that the value of total profits associated with the efficient graph G∗ can be
approximated by total profits associated with a special type of a connected nested split
graph. Following Bell (6) we denote this graph by Fn,d.
Definition 3 ((6)) Fn,d is the graph obtained from the complete graph Kd with d nodes
and a subset of n− d disconnected nodes, by adding n− d links connecting a given node
in Kd to each of the n− d disconnected nodes.
Notice that the complete graph and the spanning star are particular cases of connected
split graph: the star is K1,n = Fn,1 and the complete graph is Kn = F0,n. Figure (3)
shows several examples of this type of graph for n = 10. The number of edges in Fn,d is
given by m =
(
d
2
)
+ (n− d). Note that d ≤ n and Fn,n is just Kn.
As discussed in more detail in the Proof of the next Proposition, the maximum relative
discrepancy of total profits between Fn,d and the efficient graph G∗ is considerably small
and vanishes for large n. E.g. for n = 100 we get get an error below 2%, while for n = 200
the error is below 1%, as it can be seen in Figure (4). The higher is the number n of
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firms, the more total profits of Fn,d get close to total profits of G∗. Thus, in order to
determine the efficient network G∗, if n is small 12 one can search through all connected
nested split graphs and identify the one with highest total profits, while for large n one
can use Fn,d as a good approximation.
Bringing the above results together, we can state the following Proposition which
characterizes the topology of the efficient graph G∗ with n firms in the industry for any
level of marginal cost c ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 3 Let G∗ be the efficient graph for a given number n of firms and Fn,d be
the graph defined in (3).
(i) If c ∈ [0, 1] then G∗ is a connected nested split graph.
(ii) Denote the relative error in total profits between the the efficient graph and the
graph Fn,d as & = (Π(G∗) − Π(Fn,d))/Π(Fn,d). If c ∈ [0, 1], the relative error is
bounded from above as follows
& ≤ 2c(2c− 1)n− 5c
2
n2 + 2c(1− 2c)n+ 9c2 (16)
and vanishes for large n, i.e. limn→∞ & = 0.
(iii) If c ∈ [0, 0.5] then G∗ is the complete graph Kn.
(iv) If c > n then G∗ is the empty graph K¯n.
0 0.5 1
c
Kn
connected nested
split graph
K¯
K¯
K¯K
K
K
∼
n→∞
Fn,d
Fig. 2. Illustration of the range of efficient graphs as a function of the cost of collaboration. For costs
0 ≤ c ≤ 0.5 the efficient graph is the complete graph Kn. In the region 0.5 < c ≤ 1 the connected graphs
with stepwise matrices are efficient (1) or equivalently the connected nested split graphs. Note that for
n large, Fn,d attains total profits of G∗ with a vanishing relative error in total profits and thus can be
seen as an approximation for G∗.
Figure (2) gives a graphical representation of the results on network efficiency in Propo-
sition (3). For the particular case of n = 10 the connected graph with maximal eigenvalue
is known (3) and so is the efficient network G∗. In this case, the efficient graph is Fn,d
itself (without any approximation). In Figure (3) the efficient graphs for values of cost
c ∈ [0, 1] and n = 10 are shown. Moreover, Figure (??) shows the corresponding total
profits and number of links. We observe that, with increasing marginal cost, the efficient
network becomes more sparse and the degree heterogeneity is increasing. For any value of
12Since the number of possible connected nested split graphs is an increasing function of the number n
of nodes for small value of the cost c it is feasible to construct all the possible graphs directly and to
identify the one which maximizes total profits.
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cost larger than 0.6 the efficient network consists of a densely connected cluster (clique)
and one node that acts as a hub (star) and connects the remaining nodes to the cluster.
0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85
c
F10,10 = K10 F10,9 F10,8 F10,7
Fig. 3. Efficient graphs for values of cost c = 0.55, 0.65, 0.75, 0.85 and n = 10. The density of the efficient
graph is decreasing and the degree heterogeneity is increasing with increasing cost.
From Proposition (3), point (ii), and Figure (4) it can be seen that the relative error
& between total profits of Fn,d and G∗ is considerably small. Moreover, it is decreasing
with increasing number of firms n and vanishes for n large. In this case, we can take Fn,d
as a sufficient approximation to the efficient network G∗.
If we consider Fn,d as the efficient network, we can make the following observation.
From the topological structure of Fn,d it follows that, when marginal cost of link forma-
tion is high, it is efficient to concentrate knowledge creation in a small and dense cluster
with one firm acting as a hub that connects all the peripheral firms to the cluster. As the
marginal cost of link formation decreases, knowledge recombination becomes cheaper 13
and it is efficient that a larger fraction of firms takes part in the densely connected cluster.
Finally, in the region of small marginal cost, 0 ≤ c ≤ 0.5, it is efficient that all firms take
part in densely connected cluster, thus establishing as many collaborations as possible. In
this case, the fully connected graph of all firms is the one in which knowledge production
(measured by the growth rate of knowledge) in the economy attains its highest possible
value.
An important final remark concerns the relation to the efficient graphs found in related
models. Similar to both (36) and (4), we find that the efficient graph is always connected
and that it includes, depending on c, the star and the complete graph. However, differently
from the former model, it is, in general, not minimally connected (removing one link
does not necessarily make the graph disconnected). Moreover, differently from the latter
model, Fn,d includes a whole class of graphs that can be seen as intermediate graphs
between the star and the complete graph, these being the two extreme cases.
13Note that for c = 0 the problem in (14) can be reduced to the problem of maximizing total knowledge
growth in the steady state for a given number of firms, in which case the complete graph is the solution.
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3.2. Efficiency and Profits Distribution
Former works on R&D networks (see 13) have emphasized the emergence of a trade-off
between efficiency (in terms of knowledge diffusion) and inequality (in terms of knowledge
levels). A similar trade-off emerges also in this model, between efficiency and profits, if
the marginal cost of link formation and the number of firms operating in the industry
are high enough. We measure inequality in profits in terms of profit variance.
In Proposition (2) we have shown that for c ∈ [0, 1] the efficient graph is connected,
G∗ ∈ H(n, k). Thus, the returns from collaborations in an efficient graph are identical for
all firms (since they have the same largest real eigenvalue) but the cost is different and
is proportional the degree of the firm. More formally, let us define by σ2pi the variance of
profits associated with the graph G. It follows for a graph G ∈ H(n,m)
σ2pi(G) = c
2σ2d(G), (17)
where σ2d is the degree variance. Since degree is by definition homogeneous in a complete
graph, from Proposition (3) it follows that for c ≤ 0.5 profits inequality is zero, and no
tension between efficiency and equality arises.
For higher values of costs, we can take Fn,d as a sufficient approximation to the ef-
ficient network G∗, and we can conclude that the efficient network is characterized by
considerable degree heterogeneity and profits inequality. More precisely, the following
proposition can be stated.
Proposition 4 Let Fn,d be the graph defined in (3) and d¯ = 2m/n its the average degree.
Then
(i) The degree variance is growing quadratically with the number of firms, i.e.
σ2d(Fn,d) = O(n2). (18)
(ii) Let c > 0.5. The coefficient of variation of degree, cv(Fn,d) = σd(Fn,d)/d¯ tends, for
large n, to a constant value dependent on cost
lim
n→∞ cv(Fn,d) =
√
2c− 1. (19)
(iii) Consider the random graph G(n,m) with n nodes and m links. For large n, the
variance of the graph Fn,d is larger by a factor n than the variance of a random
graph with equal number of nodes and links
σ2d(Fn,d)/σ
2
d(G(n,m)) = O(n). (20)
The results of this Proposition are illustrated in Figure 4. The coefficient of variation
of degree, cv, increases with increasing cost (Figure 4, top-left). It also increases with
the number of firms up to the finite limit of
√
2c− 1 for large n. Equation (17) implies
that the inequality in profits increases with cost as well. Moreover, the degree variance
of Fn,d is many times larger than the degree variance of a random graph G(n,m) with
the same density (Figure 4, bottom-left). It follows that, for higher values of marginal
cost 0.5 < c ≤ 1, the industry displays an inequality in profits significantly larger than
the one that could be observed if collaborations would be formed at random.
16
  
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4 n = 50
n = 100
n = 200
c
&¯%
 
 
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 10
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
n = 50
n = 100
n = 200
c
c v
(F
n
,d
)
√
2c− 1
 
 
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 10
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
n = 50
n = 100
n = 200
c
σ
2 d
(F
n
,d
)
 
 
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
20
40
60
80
100 n = 50
n = 100
n = 200
c
σ
2 d
(F
n
,d
)/
σ
2 d
(G
(n
,m
))
Fig. 4. Properties of the Fn,d graph as a function of the cost of collaboration. Upper bound "¯ on the
relative error " in the approximation of the efficient graph G∗ (top, left); degree variance σ2d(Fn,d)
(bottom, left); degree coefficient of variation cv(Fn,d) (top, right); ratio of degree variance of Fn,d and
degree variance of a random graph G(n,m) of same size and density, σ2d(Fn,d)/σ
2
d(G(n,m)) (bottom,
right) for n = 50, n = 100 and n = 200 and cost c ∈ [0.5, 1].
4. Network Evolution
The analysis contained in the previous Section assumes that the structure of the network
is fixed. In this way, it is possible to study which network topologies maximize welfare.
In this Section we depart from this static network perspective, and we investigate how
the structure of the network evolves whenever firms are allowed to endogenously choose
the partners with whom they want to collaborate.
Following Jackson and Watts (36) we consider a network formation process in which
the creation of a new link requires the bilateral agreement of the two parties involved.
However, the deletion of a link requires the unilateral decision of one of the two firms
only. Consistently, as network equilibrium criterion, we adopt the definition of pairwise
stability, as in Jackson and Watts (36). Based on this definition of stability, we derive the
conditions on the value of cost for which structures like the empty graph, the complete
graph or the star are stable. Among the possible stable graphs, we find also a disconnected
graph consisting of multiple cliques of the same size. A first important finding here is the
co-existence of multiple equilibrium networks for the same values of cost.
However, these relatively simple structures are not the only stable networks emerging
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in our model. Since it is increasingly difficult to derive general proofs of stability for more
complex structures, we follow the argument in Vega-Redondo (55, p. 208) and we perform
a dynamic study of network stability. We model explicitly the evolution process in which,
at the beginning of each period, a pair of firms decides whether to form or delete a link,
based on the expected profits this action brings about. This investigation, performed
through computer simulation, shows that there exist a multitude of complex structures
which are pairwise stable. Remarkably, these networks display topological properties that
are consistent with the stylized facts of R&D networks, in a region of the parameters of
the model.
4.1. Improving Paths and Equilibrium Networks
We consider a process of network evolution in which firms form or delete one link at
a time based on the marginal profits they expect from that action. In other words, new
links are created whenever the increase in the probability of innovation, i.e. the marginal
revenue of a new collaboration, is greater than the marginal cost of collaboration, with
the gain being strict for at least one of the firms in the selected pair. Likewise, link
deletion occurs whenever the saving in marginal cost from removing a collaboration are
enough to compensate for the decrease in marginal revenue. However, given its unilateral
nature, we assume that removing a collaboration involves severance costs 14 so that the
savings in marginal costs from removing a collaboration is reduced by a factor α.
As in Jackson and Watts (36), we call Improving Path, the sequence of networks
{Gt}t∈N+ such that (i) any two adjacent networks differ only by one link, (ii) if the
link is added both firms benefit, at least one of them strictly, and (iii) if a link is deleted,
at least one of the two firms strictly benefit .
Improving Paths emanating from any initial network must either lead to an equilibrium
network structure (where no pair of firms has an incentive to form a link, and no single
firm has an incentive to remove a link) or to a cycle, in which a finite number of networks
is repeatedly visited (see Lemma 1 in 36). In this Section we investigate both equilibrium
networks and cycles.
Denote as G + ij (G− ij) the graph obtained from G by adding (removing) the edge
ij. Denote by λi(G) the largest eigenvalue of the connected component to which the firm
i belongs. Note that, although link deletion implies that the degree of i is reduced by
one (and so is the cost for firm i), the firm saves only a fraction α of the cost due to the
presence of the severance costs v(c) = (1 − αc). A network is pairwise stable whenever
the following conditions are fulfilled.
Definition 4 Let λi(G) denote λPF(Gi(t)). Then the graph G is pairwise stable if
(i) ∀ij ∈ E(G), pii(G) ≥ pii(G − ij) and pij(G) ≥ pij(G − ij) or, equivalently, ∀ij ∈
E(G), λi(G)− λi(G− ij) ≥ αc and λj(G)− λj(G− ij) ≥ αc
(ii) ∀ij /∈ E(G), if pii(G + ij) > pii(G) then pij(G + ij) < pij(G), and, if pij(G + ij) >
pij(G) then pii(G+ij) < pii(G) or, equivalently, ∀ij /∈ E(G), if λi(G+ij)−λi(G) > c
then λj(G+ij)−λj(G) < c, and, if λj(G+ij)−λj(G) > c then λi(G+ij)−λi(G) < c
14These severance costs can be associated with the legal procedures needed to unilaterally bring a
contract to an end, or it can have a different nature, e.g. be associated with the loss of reputation for
managers breaking long-lasting collaborations.
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Fig. 5. Largest real eigenvalue λPF of a network of n = 50 firms as a function of the number m of
links, along a specific Improving Path (optimal). At every step, among all possible new links in the
network, the one that gives the best possible increase in expected profits (and thus in λPF) is created.
Moreover, the straight line depicts the average λPF.
Before moving to the analysis of the stability of different graphs, we give an intuition
about why in our model the network might stop evolving along an Improving Path and
reach an equilibrium. Let us consider an Improving Path along which the number m of
links is increasing from m1 = 0 (the empty graph) to at most m2 = n(n − 1)/2 (the
complete graph Kn). For any network in this sequence, λPF(m) can be computed. Since
the largest eigenvalue is bounded (λPF(G′) ≤ λPF(Kn) = n− 1, see Lemma 1), it follows
the average increase of λPF(m) is 2n . This is represented in Figure (5) by the straight line
with slope 2n . The curve of the function λPF(m) is also shown for a particular Improving
Path for an industry of n = 50 firms, starting from the empty graph. At every step,
among all possible new links in the network, the one that gives the best possible increase
in expected profits and thus in λPF is created (where we assume that c = 0 and no links
are removed). As a matter of fact, not only in this particular Improving Path but along
any Improving Path, λPF(m) starts off above the straight line and since it has to reach
the same bound as the straight line, the increment of ∆λPF(m) has to be smaller than 2n
for some number of links m ≤ mmax = n(n− 1)/2. Therefore, for any value of cost, if n
is large enough there will be a value of m, along the Improving Path, where the marginal
revenue is smaller than the marginal cost. This is stated more precisely in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 5 Along any Improving Path with an increasing number m of links the
marginal profit becomes negative for some value of m ≤ mmax, for any given value c of
cost and n large enough.
In light of the foregoing results we now proceed to investigate the stability of specific
network structures. From a straightforward application of the properties of marginal
revenue from collaboration (cf. item (iii) in Lemma (1)) it follows that, on one hand,
when marginal costs are zero (c = 0) links will always be created and no existing link
will be deleted. It follows that the only equilibrium is the complete graph Kn.
Proposition 6 If costs are zero, c = 0, then the complete graph Kn is the unique stable
network.
On the other hand, when the difference between marginal costs c and severance costs
v(c) is larger than one, it is profitable to remove any link and the only equilibrium is the
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Fig. 6. Two complete graphs, K9, connected through an edge.
empty graph K¯n.
Proposition 7 For cost c′ = αc > 1 the empty graph K¯n is the unique stable network.
Besides the foregoing extreme situations, the determination of stable networks becomes
quite involved. This is because, in general, the marginal revenue from a collaboration
depends on the topology of the graph. In addition, for a given topology, it varies with the
position of the firm which is chosen to create or delete a link. Starting from an initial graph
G0 this property implies that different network trajectories can be explored, according
to the particular pair of firms that is allowed to revise its collaboration strategy at the
beginning of each period. Thus, multiple equilibrium networks might be possible for the
same level of marginal costs. In what follows we show that, on one hand, multiple pairwise
stable networks exist for the same value of marginal cost c ∈ (0, 1) and severance costs
v(c). On the other hand, we identify a region of costs in the same interval in which
stable networks do not exist and a sequence of networks is repeatedly visited 15 . In the
following Proposition, we show that a set of disconnected cliques of the same size can be
a stable network, if their size falls within a certain interval that depends on the marginal
cost of collaboration c and on the severance cost parameter α.
Proposition 8 Consider costs c, c′ = αc and α ∈ [0, 1]. If the network G consists of a
set of k equally sized, disconnected cliques K1n,K2n, ...,Kkn (G having kn nodes in total)
then G is stable if 16
.1 + c(1− c)
c
/ ≤ n ≤ 02− c
′(1− c′)
c′
1. (21)
An example of stable graph formed by disconnected cliques of the same size is shown
in Figure 6. From Proposition (16) it follows immediately that for a given value of cost
c there exist multiple integer values n (the size of the clique) that fit into the interval
spanned by the above mentioned upper and lower bounds. Thus, multiple equilibrium
networks exist for a given value of marginal cost c and severance cost v(c). Note that
the homogeneous size of the clique is only a sufficient condition for stability but it is not
necessary. Indeed, the equilibrium networks obtained with computer simulations show
clearly that there exist equilibria with disconnected cliques of different sizes (see e.g.
Figure (9), bottom-right). The requirement of having cliques of the same size is rather
15This is a cycle in the space of network trajectories, to not confuse with the specific graph called cycle.
16 In the following, #x$, where x is a real valued number x ∈ R, denotes the smallest integer larger or
equal than x (the ceiling of x). Similarly, %x& the largest integer smaller or equal than x (the floor of x).
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Fig. 7. A star K1,8 and (i) the creation of a link or (ii) the removal of a link.
limiting but allows for a more simple analytical investigation of the existence of stable
networks.
Equally sized disconnected cliques are not the only possible stable networks structures
in the interval c ∈ (0, 1)∩α ∈ [0, 1]. The next Proposition shows that the spanning star,
i.e. the star encompassing all nodes, can be pairwise stable as well, if the size of the star
(and therewith the number of firms in the industry) falls within a certain region that
depends on the cost c and on the severance cost parameter α.
Proposition 9 Consider costs c, c′ = αc, α ∈ [0, 1]. The network G consisting of a
spanning star K1,n−1 with 1 + .
√
2−c
2c / ≤ n ≤ 0 1+c
′2(6+c′2)
4c′2 1 is stable.
The foregoing results have two important implications in relation to the literature.
First, the stable graphs are not necessarily connected. Second, in general they are not
minimally connected. Indeed, the multiple clique equilibrium is a disconnected graph
in which each component is complete and thus not minimally connected. This is an
important feature that for instance distinguishes our model from the “connections” model
in Jackson and Watts (36) and from the linear “two-way flow” model Bala and Goyal (4).
In both such models, the equilibrium networks are always connected, while in the latter
they are also minimally connected. Furthermore, both models find that the spanning star
is stable for intermediate values of the cost of collaboration. However, differently from
both models, in our model the spanning star is never the unique stable network. Indeed,
the next Proposition combines together the results of the previous two propositions,
the conditions under which the link formation dynamics defined in (5) may lead to two
different pairwise stable network topologies for the same level of marginal cost c and
severance cost parameter α, namely (i) the set of disconnected equally sized cliques or
(ii) the spanning star.
Proposition 10 Consider costs c, c′ = αc, α ∈ [0, 1] and the network G with n nodes
such that 1+.
√
2−c
2c / ≤ n ≤ 0 1+c
′2(6+c′2)
4c′2 1. If there exists an integer k ≤ n, mod (n, k) =
0 such that . 1+c(1−c)c / ≤ k ≤ 0 2−c
′(1−c′)
c′ 1 then G can be stable for at least two cases.
(i) G consists of disconnected cliques K1k , ...,K
d
k , n = kd or
(ii) G consists of a spanning star K1,n−1.
There are at least two stable networks for the same level of marginal cost c (degenerate
cost region).
Not all values of marginal cost c and severance cost parameter α lead to pairwise stable
networks. Consistently with the concept of Improving Path (cf. 36, , Lemma 1) the next
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Proposition shows that in the interval (0.586, 0.618), there exists a cycle of repeatedly
visited networks, . The Proposition provides explicitly the network structures visited in
the cycle.
Proposition 11 If we have values of cost 2 − √2 = 0.586 < c < 12
(√
5− 1) = 0.618
and α ∈ [0.707, 1] then the Improving Path leads to a cycle of networks. In this cycle, a
sequence of paths (P2, {P2, P2}, P4, P3, P2) is repeatedly visited.
The graphs which are repeatedly visited are illustrated in Figure (8). The fact that for
Fig. 8. Cycle C = (P2, {P2, P2}, P4, P3) of repeatedly visited graphs in which one graph is improved by
the next in the sequence.
some values of the parameters of the model no network is stable is found also by (36)
and by (30; 31).
4.2. Stability vs Efficiency
The existence, for the same level of marginal cost, of multiple equilibrium structures
associated with different values of total profits, implies that stable networks can, in
general, be inefficient. In particular, we have shown that in the marginal cost interval
i¸n(0, 1), graphs that are not connected can be stable (cf. Propositions 16 and 10), while in
that cost region the efficient graph is always connected (cf. Proposition 2). The possible
inefficiency of network evolution process stems from externalities inherent in the process
of knowledge recombination, described in Section 2.2. Indeed, when a firm decides to
create or delete a link it takes into account its private marginal revenue from collaboration
(given by the change in the largest eigenvalue of its connected component), but neglects
social marginal revenues inherent to that decision. The latter is equal to the sum of
changes in the largest eigenvalue of all firms belonging to the same connected component.
Thus, it may well be that creating a link is not profitable for the individual firm although
it would be profitable from the industry point of view.
Furthermore, the efficient network may not even belong to the set of equilibria, as
shown by the next proposition.
Proposition 12 Consider a network of size n ≥ 2c . For cost c < 12 the equilibrium
network is not efficient.
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This result can be explained in the following way. Proposition (3) states that, when the
marginal cost of link formation is less or equal to 1/2, the complete graph is the efficient
graph. However, if the number n of firms in the industry is large enough, the individual
marginal revenue of a collaboration is bounded from above by a value decreasing with n
(see proof of the proposition). In particular, for n ≥ 2c the upper bound is always smaller
than the marginal cost c. Therefore the complete graph is not stable 17 .
A complete discussion of efficiency and stability would require the determination of
total and firm’s profits of all possible graphs. Both require the computation of the largest
eigenvalue. Unfortunately, there is no closed form solution available for any graph. How-
ever, one can provide general results for some special classes of graphs. Table (1) sum-
marizes the results on efficiency and stability discussed so far and compare them with
results for other quite well known classes of graphs in the literature.
Three graphs in the table deserve a special attention. The first is the empty graph,
which is never stable nor efficient in the interval [0, 1]. The second one is the complete
graph, which is efficient in [0, 0.5], but is never stable for c > 0. As we saw earlier, this
is due to the fact that, when the graph becomes very dense, the marginal revenue of an
additional link becomes smaller and smaller. The third graph is the star, which can be
stable but is never efficient in [0, 1]. In other words, both the star and the complete graph
are never stable and efficient at the same time. This is a first important difference with
respect to the models in (36) and (4), where, at least in an interval of the parameters,
the star (or, respectively, the complete graph) can be efficient and stable. In our model
the tension between efficiency and stability is more pronounced. We were not able to find
any efficient graph which is also stable, except from the trivial case of c = 0 in which,
due the absence of collaboration cost the complete graph is both stable and efficient.
Moreover, it is interesting to review the properties of the other graphs listed in the
table and their mutual relations. A k-regular graph, i.e. a graph in which all nodes have
the same degree, yields a revenue proportional to the degree of the nodes, regardless what
is the size of the graph. This means that when the degree is small the performance of this
graph is rather poor. However, the complete graph is a particular case of regular graph
in which all nodes have degree n− 1. In this case, the regular graph can be efficient.
The set of cliques of the same size, is stable for particular values of the size n, depending
on the level of costs. It can also be efficient, in the particular case of a set consisting of
one clique, i.e. the complete graph. In this case however, it is never stable, as noted
above. The set of identical cliques is also a particular case of k-regular graph, because
the nodes in each clique have the same degree. In a path, the degree of the nodes is two
except from the two nodes at the beginning and at the end of the path. In this sense,
the graph is similar to a 2-regular graph. Indeed its eigenvalue is a little smaller than
the one of 2-regular graph. When the network evolves starting from an empty graph, the
first connected graph that is formed is indeed a path of length 2, possibly followed by
a path of length 3 (see proof of Proposition 5). In this transition, the largest eigenvalue
of the component jumps from 0 to 1 and then to 2 cos(pi4 ) > 1. Instead, when the graph
17Another (degenerate) region of the parameter space in which the network dynamics leads to inefficient
equilibrium outcomes is the one in which marginal cost is in the open interval (0.586, 0.618). In that case
(cf. Proposition (11)), for any number of firms in the industry the dynamics gets stuck into a cycle of
networks, none of which is efficient.
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is almost complete, the addition of a link yield a little change in the eigenvalue. Notice
that the path of length 3 is also a star with one hub and two peripheral nodes.
A cycle is a closed path and it is in particular a 2-regular graph. In a cycle there is
only one walk, which yields a revenue independent on the number of participating firms.
As we already noticed in Section 2.3, this is a consequence of the payoff function in this
model which differs remarkably in this respect from the one used in other models in the
literature (e.g. 4). Finally we also list in the table the bipartite graph because of its
relation to the notion of structural holes. Consider a network consisting of few hubs,
disconnected among them, and of many peripheral nodes, connected to one or more hubs
but disconnected among them. In such a network, the hubs are filling the structural holes
among the the peripheral nodes. Such a network is, in particular, a bipartite graph, since
the hubs and the peripheral nodes form two separate classes and links connect only nodes
of one class to nodes of the other class. Notice that the star is also a particular case of
a bipartite graph. The cases n1 = 1 (or n2 = 1) would refer to the star K1,n2−1 (or
K1,n1−1).
4.3. Topological Properties of Stable Networks
The empirical research on R&D partnerships has investigated in depth the topological
patterns of networks of knowledge exchange. From this literature (see e.g. 2; 21; 32; 47),
three features emerge as robust stylized facts: (i) R&D networks are sparse, that is the
number of actual links is much less than the number of possible links. (ii) Networks
are highly clustered, where clusters consist of highly interconnected firms, but different
clusters are only sparsely connected. (iii) The distribution of links over the firms is
characterized by high dispersion, with few firms being connected to many others.
The analytical study of equilibrium networks in Section 4 has pointed to the existence
of equilibrium networks that match some of the stylized facts mentioned above. Indeed,
equally sized cliques are characterized by a high clustering, while the spanning star shows
high degree heterogeneity. All these networks belong to the set of possible equilibria
structures in our model.
In this Section we define an explicit process of network evolution that is a particular
case of improving path and we analyze via computer simulation the structural properties
of stable networks in our model. In this way, we assess whether our model is also able to
generate pairwise stable structures that feature, at the same time, all the stylized facts
of R&D networks.
There are several possible processes which would be consistent with the definition
of improving path and the set of selected equilibria depends in general on the specific
process. In this work, we investigate a stochastic process in which all pairs of firms have
the same probability to be selected to revise their R&D collaboration strategy (cf. 55, p.
212).
Definition 5 (Myopic Pairwise Dynamics) Let Gt denote the graph at time t. We
define the network formation process Γ(G) as follows. At the beginning of each period (at
times t = 0, T, 2T, ...) a single pair of firms, i and j, is uniformly selected at random.
(i) If the link ij does not currently exist, ij /∈ Gt, then it is created whenever neither
player is harmed by the creation and at least one of them strictly gains, i.e.
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pii(Gt + ij, c) ≥ pii(Gt, c) ∧ pij(Gt + ij, c) ≥ pij(Gt, c)∧
pii(Gt + ij, c) > pii(Gt, c) ∨ pij(Gt + ij, c) > pij(Gt, c).
(22)
or equivalently
λi(Gt + ij)− λi(Gt) ≥ c ∧ λj(Gt + ij)− λj(Gt) ≥ c∧
λi(Gt + ij)− λi(Gt) > c ∨ λj(Gt + ij)− λj(Gt) > c.
(23)
(ii) If the link ij is currently in place, ij ∈ Gt−1, then it is removed whenever at least
one of the players strictly gains from the change, with link deletion involving the
cost v(c) = (1− α)c, α ∈ [0, 1]. More formally
pii(Gt − ij, c, v) > pii(Gt, c, v) ∨ pij(Gt − ij, c, v) > pij(Gt, c, v), (24)
or equivalently:
λi(Gt)− λi(Gt − ij) < αc ∨ λj(Gt)− λj(Gt − ij) < αc (25)
Note that, in the evolution of the network defined above the only element of stochasticity
is the sequence of the pairs of firms chosen to create or delete links.
We study stable network structures arising from this process in computational experi-
ments 18 conducted in a large region of the model’s parameter space. More precisely, we
carried out multiple (50 repetitions for each parameter choice) computer simulations of
the network dynamics defined in (5) with a fixed number n of firms in the industry 19
(n = 50), starting each from an empty network K¯n. For each simulation we selected a
value for the marginal cost c in the interval (0, 1) and a value for the severance cost
parameter α in the interval 20 [0, 0.5]. As the number of chosen values were respectively
12 for the marginal cost and 5 for the severance cost parameter, the total number of com-
puter simulations summed up to 3000. The results of the aforementioned Monte-Carlo
experiments are shown in the Figures from (9) to (11).
The plots in Figure (9) show typical equilibrium networks obtained in simulations for
marginal cost of link formation equal to 0.15 and different values of the severance cost
parameter α. Recall that severance cost are equal to v = (1−α)c, and thus are inversely
related to the parameter α. As the plots reveal, in this region of the parameter space the
dynamics in our model is able to generate equilibrium structures displaying the complex
features that characterize R&D networks observed in reality. In particular, for very high
severance costs the equilibrium network contains a giant component with a high degree
heterogeneity. On the other hand, as the severance cost associated with link deletion fall
down (increasing values of α), we observe a significant increase in the cliquishness of the
network, and a reduction of degree heterogeneity.
The insights coming from the foregoing qualitative study are confirmed by a more
quantitative analysis of the topological properties of equilibrium graphs. The plots in
18When simulating the network evolution discussed in Section 4 the largest real eigenvalue of the network
has to be computed many times. Since the largest real eigenvalue of a graph can be computed in
polynomial time (33) our model is well suited for numerical investigations.
19Choosing a different, possibly higher, number of firms would have not altered the results, as only the
size (the number of firms) of the connected components, and not the total size of the system matters for
the dynamics.
20Preliminary simulation studies with values of α greater than 0.5 for the severance cost did not reveal
the presence of any striking difference in the results.
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Fig. 9. Equilibrium networks for n = 50, c = 0.15, (a) α = 0.0, (b) α = 0.1, and (c) α = 1.0 starting
from an empty network. Relative profits (compared to the firm with highest profits in the network) are
indicated with different shades of red, meaning that nodes with higher relative profits are shown in a
lighter shade. The network plots use the Fruchterman-Reingolg algorithm (22).
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Fig. 10. Average degree 〈d¯〉 and degree variance 〈σ2d〉 in the equilibrium network for n = 50, c ∈ [0, 1],
starting from an empty network (averaged over 50 simulations).
Figure (10) display respectively the mean and the variance of the network degree distri-
bution as functions of the marginal cost c and severance cost parameter α. The mean
degree is inversely related to the sparseness of the graph, while degree variance captures
the degree heterogeneity. As the plots in the figure make clear, higher cost of R&D col-
laboration lead to graphs that are more sparse. On the other hand, degree heterogeneity
reaches a peak for values of marginal cost close to 0.1, and then falls down as collab-
oration cost increase. In addition, degree heterogeneity increases with severance costs
(decreasing α).
The presence of clusters of highly interconnected firms is a key feature of real world
R&D networks (cf. stylized fact number (iii)). As the plots in Figure (11) show, this
feature is also a characteristic for the equilibrium networks generated by the model. In
particular, the average clustering coefficient (Figure (11), top-left) is close to one in a
wide region of the explored parameter space (c ∈ (0, 0.5), α > 0). Moreover, it is a
decreasing function of severance costs v = (1−α)c. Finally, note that clustering becomes
zero for values of costs greater or equal to 0.7. Further information on the topological
features of R&D clusters can be gathered by looking at the average number of connected
components, at their average size and the concentration of their size (Figure (11), top-
right, bottom-left and bottom-right respectively). As the plots in the Figure indicate, the
the number of connected components is an increasing function of collaboration costs while
the average size and its concentration variables are negatively related to collaboration
costs. In addition, as the costs of link severance increase the number of components
increases, while component size and its concentration decrease.
Joining together the foregoing results we can conclude that sparse equilibrium net-
works organized in clusters of highly interconnected firms are a distinctive feature of the
network dynamics in our model. Moreover, low values of the R&D collaboration costs
and high values of the costs of link severance lead to equilibrium structures characterized
by a small number of large components, with a highly dispersed degree distribution. As
collaboration costs increase and as link severance costs decrease, we observe that equilib-
rium networks tend to be more and more organized in size homogeneous cliques having
only few connections among them.
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Fig. 11. Average clustering coefficient 〈C〉 (top, left), average number of components 〈NH〉 (top, right),
average size of components 〈|H|〉 (bottom, right) and average Herfindal index of components size con-
centration 〈hH〉 (bottom, right) in the equilibrium network for n = 50, c ∈ [0, 1], starting from an empty
network (averaged over 50 simulations).
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the efficiency and the evolution of networks of
knowledge exchange across firms. We developed a model in which firms recombine their
knowledge stock with the stocks of knowledge of other firms in the industry, in order
to introduce innovations in the market. Since each collaboration is costly for firms they
face a trade-off between the benefits of new collaborations (in terms of an increase in the
expected number of innovations per period) and the cost associated with it. Furthermore,
we showed that under mild conditions on the horizon over which the performance of R&D
collaborations is evaluated, the benefit the firm receives from the network depends on
the growth rate of all walks existing across firms in their connected component. To this
end, our model can be seen as extending other popular models in the network formation
literature (cf. the “Connections” model in Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996, and the linear
“Two-Way Flow” model without decay in Bala and Goyal, 2000).
Within the foregoing framework, we characterized the topology of the efficient graph
for any level of the marginal cost of collaboration. We showed that, when the marginal
cost of maintaining collaborations is low, the efficient network is the complete graph.
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Thus, when collaboration costs are low, a network of densely connected firms maximizes
industry total profits. On the other hand, as the marginal cost of collaboration increases it
is better for the industry network to display the presence of structural holes. In particular,
for intermediate costs of collaboration the efficient graph belongs to the class of nested
split graphs, characterized by the presence of hubs linking a clique to a set of disconnected
firms. Furthermore, we showed that nested-split graphs are characterized by significant
cross-firm profit inequality, increasing both in collaboration costs and size of the industry.
Finally, we showed that for very large costs of collaboration the empty graph is efficient.
We then studied the existence of equilibrium graphs in the model, and the relation
between equilibrium and efficiency. For this purpose, we employed the notion of “Im-
proving Path” (cf. 36), and we assumed that the deletion of existing connections involves
a severance cost. In line with the concept of Improving Path (see 36, Lemma (1)), we
identified regions of collaboration and severance costs in which there exist either pairwise
stable graphs or a closed cycles of networks. As far as pairwise stable networks are con-
cerned, we showed that different network structures are stable for the same level of costs.
In particular, we identified regions of the collaboration and severance costs in which (i)
the class of (different-size) equisized disconnected cliques is stable, (ii) the spanning star
(i.e. the star encompassing all firms in the network), and the class of size-homogeneous
disconnected cliques are stable. In turn, the source of multiplicity of equilibria lies in (i)
the strong path dependency involved in partner selection decisions, (ii) in the presence
of external effects affecting marginal revenue of collaborations for firms belonging to the
same connected component and (iii) the inertia arising from the presence of a severance
cost associated with link deletion. The presence of multiple stable structures for the same
level of collaboration costs implies that, in general, efficient structures are not attained
in our model. Furthermore, we identified a region of the size of the industry and of costs
in which the efficient graph is never attained.
Finally, we investigated the topological characteristics of pairwise stable graphs in
our model, to see whether they are able to replicate the stylized facts on empirically
observed R&D networks. To this end, we studied via computer simulations the properties
of equilibria selected under a two-sided myopic pairwise dynamics (cf. 55). The results of
our simulations show that the existence of a region of low marginal costs of collaboration
and high costs of link deletion in which the aforementioned dynamics is able to select
pairwise stable structures matching the stylized facts on R&D networks.
The present work could be extended at least in three ways. First, the model could
be extended to account for industry demand, for example like in (25), and then study
how the efficiency and dynamics of network structure may change when firms operate
markets that are interdependent. Second, one could investigate whether the foregoing
results about the properties of stable networks are robust to different link updating
algorithms. For example, one could study the effect of network dynamics of introducing
firms pursuing different strategies, for example of the kind explored in (4). Likewise, one
could depart from the strong assumptions we made about the knowledge of the network
the firms have, and about their ability to forecast the stream of innovations out of a
given network of collaborations, and rather pursue the way of studying the efficiency
and emergence of network structures when firms follow more simple rules of behavior,
for example of the kind suggested in the empirical work by (47). Third, in the present
model we assumed that the knowledge bases of firms in the industry were sufficiently
homogeneous to be transferred across firms. However, the process of knowledge transfer
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across firms is likely to be shaped by its degree of tacitness, as well as by the existing
technological complementarities across sectors and firms’ knowledge bases. In addition,
as argued at more length in (19; 44) technological dynamics into an industry, i.e. the
evolution of the nature of problem solving strategies and learning processes, is likely
to be a fundamental determinant of any industrial structure, and in particular of the
network of firms of R&D collaborations. A further analysis of R&D network dynamics
and efficiency should therefore embed all the foregoing ingredients related to industry
technology, and try to investigate how they may affect the revenues and costs of the
process of knowledge recombination.
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Appendix
In the Appendix we give the proofs of the Propositions and Lemmas stated in the
preceding Sections.
Proof of Proposition (1) The adjacency matrix A(G) is diagonalizable (27) and thus,
the general solution of (4) can be written as (61)
x(t) =
n∑
j=1
cjvjeλjt, (.1)
where ci are unknown constants, that are determined by the initial values x(0) =∑n
j=1 cjvj , λPF = λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ ...λn are the real eigenvalues of A and v1, ...,vn the
corresponding eigenvectors. In (.1) only those eigenvalues and corresponding eigenvec-
tors of the adjacency matrix of the connected component Gi of firm i appear. All other
eigenvalues have vanishing eigenvector components and do not contribute to the tra-
jectory. This is intuitively clear since firms in disconnected components have decoupled
equations of the form (4) and their trajectories can be computed independently. We get
λPF − x˙i(t)xi(t) =
λPFxi(t)−x˙i(t)
xi(t)
=
∑n
j=1
cjvjie
λj t(λPF−λj)
xi(t)
=
∑n
j=2
cjvjie
λj t(λPF−λj)∑n
j=1
cjvjie
λjt
.
(.2)
In the numerator of (.2) we obtain a sum of exponentials with one exponential term less
than in the denominator, namely the one with the largest real eigenvalue in the exponent.
We have that the sum of exponentials converges to the exponential with the largest real
eigenvalue. Consider for example aeλ1t + beλ2t = aeλ1t
(
1 + bae
(λ2−λ1)t) ∼ aeλ1t for large
t. This also holds in general. Thus we get
λPF − lim
t→∞
x˙i(t)
xi(t)
= lim
t→∞
c2v2ieλ2t(λPF − λ2)
c1v1ieλPFt
∝ lim
t→∞ e
−(λPF−λ2)t = 0. (.3)
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In what follows we compute a lower bound for the order of convergence. Consider the
real eigenvalues λPF = λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ ... ≥ λn of the adjacency matrix A. We have that∑n
j=1 λ
2
i = tr(A2) = 2m (7). Thus, we get
λ22 = 2m− λ2PF −
∑n
j=3 λ
2
i
≤ 2m− λ2PF
≤ 2m− ( 2mn )2
= 2m(n
2−2m)
n2 .
(.4)
Here we use the fact that λPF ≥ 2mn (7). Therefore we get
λPF − λ2 ≥= 2m−
√
2m(n2 − 2m)
n
, (.5)
which is positive and a monotonic increasing function for n2/4 < m ≤ n(n− 1)/2.
Proof of Corollary (1) The proof follows directly from an application of the following
Lemma.
Lemma 3 Consider a continuous function f : [0,∞) → R that converges to a finite
value λ, i.e. limt→∞ f(t) = λ <∞. Then
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
f(t)dt = λ. (.6)
Proof of Lemma (3) Denote F (T ) = 1T
∫ T
0 f(t)dt. We can write
F (T ) =
1
T
∫ τ ′
0
f(t)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤cτ ′
+
1
T
∫ T
τ ′
f(t)dt. (.7)
The first integral in the above expression is finite since any continuous function on a
compact set (0, τ ′) has a maximum denoted by c. Since f(t) converges to λ for any &′ we
can find a τ ′(&′) such that for all t ≥ τ ′ we have |f(t)− λ| < &′. Thus we get
|F (T )− λ| ≤ | 1T
(
cτ ′ +
∫ T
τ ′ f(t)dt
)
− λ|
≤ 1T
(
|c|τ ′ + | ∫ Tτ ′ f(t)dt− λT |)
≤ 1T
(
|c|τ ′ + ∫ Tτ ′ |f(t)− λ|dt + (T − τ ′ − T )λ)
≤ 1T (|c|τ ′ + &′(T − τ ′)− τ ′λ)
= (|c|−λ)τ
′
T +
T−τ ′
T &
′
≤ |c|τ ′T + &′.
(.8)
We define
& = |c|τ
′
T + &
′
τ = |c|τ
′
$−$′ .
(.9)
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Since ∂$∂T = − |c|τ
′
T 2 < 0 we have that |F (T ) − λ| < & for T > τ . For any & ≥ 0 we
can find an &′ < & and the corresponding τ ′(&′) from which we compute τ(&) such that
|F (T )− λ| < & for all T > τ(&). This means that limT→∞ F (T ) = λ.
Proof of Lemma (2) Since G1 and G2 are connected, we have that m1 ≥ n1 − 1
and m2 ≥ n2 − 1 (59). We now consider different cases for the number of edges in the
components.
(i) m1 ≥ n1 and m2 ≥ n2: Assume that the largest eigenvalue of G1 is λPF(G1) ≥
λPF(G2). Let G′ be the graph obtained as follows: for each node in G2 we rewire
one incident edge to a node in G1. In this way, all nodes in G2 are connected to G1.
The number of rewired edges is n2 (and there are at least that many edges since
m2 ≥ n2 by assumption).
There exists a relationship between the largest real eigenvalue of a graph and
those of its subgraphs (16): if H is a subgraph of G, H ⊆ G, then λPF(H) ≤
λPF(G).
Therefore, λPF(G′) ≥ λPF(G1) ≥ λPF(G2). And total profits of G′ are
Π(G′) = (n1 + n2)λPF(G′)− 2(m1 + m2)c
≥ n1λPF(G1) + n2λPF(G2)− 2(m1 + m2)c
= Π(G1) +Π(G2).
(.10)
(ii) m1 ≥ n1 and m2 = n2 − 1: If m2 = n2 − 1 then the largest real eigenvalue of G2 is
at most the one of the star K1,n2−1 with λPF(G2) ≤
√
n2 − 1 (33).
We construct the graph G by connecting all nodes of K1,n2−1 to a single node in
G1 and including the remaining isolated node by adding one more edge. The graph
G has an eigenvalue λPF(G) ≥ λPF(K1,n1+n2−1) =
√
n1 + n2 − 1. Otherwise, the
edges in G are redistributed to form a star K1,n1+n2−1 and the remaining edges
attached at random. Since λPF is an increasing function of the number of edges in
the graph the inequality follows. We obtain
Π(G) = (n1 + n2)λPF(G)− 2(m+ 1)c
Π(G1) +Π(G2) = n1λPF(G1) + n2
√
n2 − 1− 2 (m1 + (n2 − 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
c (.11)
Thus, we get
Π(G)− (Π(G1) +Π(G2)) = Π(G)− (Π(G1) +Π(K1,n2−1))
= n1 (λPF(G)− λPF(G1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+n2(λPF(G)−√n2 − 1)− 2c
≥ n2(λPF(G)−
√
n2 − 1)− 2c.
(.12)
With λPF(G) ≥
√
n1 + n2 − 1 ≥
√
n2 + 1 if n1 ≥ 2 (by assumption). If the last
inequality above is large than 0, we have that
√
n2 + 1−
√
n2 − 1 ≥ 2c
n2
. (.13)
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If 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, this inequality is true if n2 ≥ 2 (by assumption).
(iii) m1 = n1 − 1 and m2 = n2 − 1: If m1 = n1 − 1 and m2 = n2 − 1, then both
components are stars, K1,n1−1 and K1,n2−1 with eigenvalues
√
n1 − 1 and
√
n2 − 1.
Construct the graph G by connecting n2−1 nodes from K1,n2−1 to the central node
in K1,n1−1. Then attach an edge to the remaining isolated node to obtain a star
G = K1,n1+n2−1.
Π(G) = Π(K1,n1+n2−1) = (n1 + n2)
√
n1 + n2 − 1− 2c(n1 + n2 − 1) (.14)
For the difference we get
Π(G)− (Π(K1,n2−1) +Π(K1,n2−1)) = n1(
√
n1 + n2 − 1−
√
n1 − 1)
+n2(
√
n1 + n2 − 1−√n2 − 1)− 2c
≥ (n1 + n2)(
√
n1 + n2 − 1−
√
n1 − 1).
(.15)
W.l.o.g. we have assumed that n1 ≥ n2. The expression above is larger or equal
than 0 if
(n1 + n2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥n1+2
(
√
n1 + n2 − 1−
√
n1 − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥√n1+1−
√
n1−1
) ≥ 2 ≥ 2c, (.16)
with n2 ≥ 2. We get √
n1 + 1−
√
n1 − 1 ≥ 2
n1 + 2
, (.17)
and the last inequality holds for n1 ≥ 2.
(iv) n1 ≥ 2 and n2 = 1: We have one isolated node and a connected graph G1. Total
profits are Π(G) = n1λPF(G1)−2m1c. Denote the graph G′ obtained by connecting
the isolated node to G1. Then
Π(G′) = (n1 + 1)λPF(G′)− 2(m1 + 1)c
≥ Π(G) + (λPF(G′)− 2c),
(.18)
We now consider three more cases:
(1) If n1 ≥ 4, then m1 ≥ n1 − 1 (since G1 is connected by assumption). We can
construct a star K1,n1−1 plus additional edges from G1 and connect the isolated
node to it. Denote the resulting graph G′. Then, λPF(G′) ≥ λPF(K1,n1) = √n1 ≥ 2.
Thus, Π(G′)−Π(G) ≥ 0 if λPF(G′) ≥ 2 ≥ 2c for c ∈ [0, 1].
(2) If n1 = 3, then G1 is either a path P3 of length 3 or a cycle C3 containing 3
nodes. We connect the isolated node to G1. In the case of G1 = P3 we get
Π(G′)−Π(G) = 4√3− 6c︸ ︷︷ ︸
Π(G′)
− (3√2− 4c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Π(G)
= 2.69− 2c > 0,
(.19)
where the last inequality follows from c ∈ [0, 1]. In the case of G1 = C3 we obtain
Π(G′)−Π(G) = 42.17− 8c︸ ︷︷ ︸
Π(G′)
− (32− 6c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Π(G)
= 2.68− 2c > 0
, (.20)
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again, using c ∈ [0, 1].
(3) For n1 = 2 we connect the isolated node to G1 = P2 and again denote the
resulting connected graph G′. We have that
Π(G′)−Π(G) = 3√2− 4c︸ ︷︷ ︸
Π(G′)
− (21− 2c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Π(G)
= 2.24− 2c > 0
, (.21)
with c ∈ [0, 1].
(v) n1 = 1 and n2 = 1: We have two isolated nodes with total profits Π(G) = 0. If we
connect the nodes via an edge we have Π(G′) = 2(1 − c). Since 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 total
profits in the connected graph G′ are higher.
The above cases consider all possible cases of disconnected graphs and show that total
profits Π can be increased by connecting them.
Proof of Proposition (2) For a contradiction assume that the efficient graph G is
disconnected (and all connected graphs have smaller total profits than G). Since G is
disconnected then it has at least two components. With proposition (2) each pair of
components can be connected, resulting in a graph with higher total profits. Ultimately
all components of G can be connected, yielding a connected graph G′ with at least the
total profits of G. This is a contradiction to the assumption that the efficient graph is
disconnected.
Proof of Proposition (3) We prove each claim of the Proposition as follows.
(i) From Lemma (2) we know that the efficient graph is connected. Moreover, (8) have
shown that among the connected graphs, the graphs with maximal eigenvalue have
a stepwise adjacency matrix. We have mentioned already that these graphs are
referred to connected nested split graphs (3).
(ii) We have introduced the graph Fn,d in Section 3.1. In order to prove the claim,
we derive a lower bound for the total profits of Fn,d, as well as an upper bound
for the total profit of the efficient graph G∗. We then show that, if one chooses d
appropriately, the relative difference between the two bounds vanishes for large n.
Let us start with the lower bound. Recall that Fn,d is the graph obtained from a
complete graph Kd of d nodes and n−d isolated nodes by connecting each isolated
node to one and the same node of Kd via one link. The number of links m in this
graph is determined by the size d of the clique, m(d) =
(
n
2
)
+ (n − d). Since Fn,d
contains Kd as a subgraph, the largest real eigenvalue of Fn,d is larger or equal to
the one of Kd, which is λPF(Kd) = d− 1. Therefore, total profits of the graph Fn,d
are bounded from below as follows:
Π(Fn,d) = nλPF (Fn,d)− 2m(d)c ≥ n(d− 1)− 2m(d)c. (.22)
Since the inequality above is valid for any integer d, such that 1 ≤ d ≤ n, we are
interested in the value of d that maximizes the right hand side of Eq. (.22), that is
d = argmax
1≤k≤n
{n(k − 1)− 2m(k)c}, (.23)
where m(k) =
(
n
2
)
+ (n − k) and k ∈ N+. By computing the first and second
derivative of the objective function n(k − 1)− 2m(k)c with respect to k, one finds
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that its maximum occurs for k = n+3c2c . For simplicity, one can take d as the closest
integer to this value 21 . Notice that, as a consequence, d converges to n2c for large
n.
Replacing d = n+3c2c in Equation (.22), we obtain a general lower bound, which
is independent of d, and given by
Π(Fn,d, c) ≥ n
2 + n(2c− 8c2) + 9c2
4c
. (.24)
We now derive an upper bound for total profits of the efficient network G∗. The
largest real eigenvalue of a connected graph is at most
√
2m− n + 1 (33) and from
this it follows immediately that total profits of G∗ are bounded by
Π(G∗, c) ≤ n√2m− n+ 1− 2mc. (.25)
We have shown already that for cost c ≤ 1/2 the efficient graph is complete.
Therefore, we are interested in values of cost c > 1/2. Assuming that c > 0.5,
the number m of edges that maximize the right hand side of Equation (.25) is
m = n
2+4nc2−4c2
8c2 .
Replacing such value of m, we obtain an upper bound that is independent on the
number m of edges,
Π(G∗, c) ≤ n
2 − 4nc2 + 4c2
4c
. (.26)
At this point, combining Equation (.24) and (.26), we obtain that the relative
difference & in the total profits of the graph Fn,d and the graph G∗ is bounded from
above
& =
Π(G∗, c)−Π(Fn,d, c)
Π(Fn,d, c)
≤ 2c(2c− 1)n− 5c
2
n2 + 2c(1− 2c)n+ 9c2 . (.27)
The expression on the right hand side of the above inequality converges to zero for
n large, and therefore the relative difference in total profits vanishes for n large.
(iii) Since for the complete graph it is λPF = n− 1 and m = n(n−1)2 , its total profits are
given by
Π(Kn) = n(n− 1)− 2n(n− 1)2 c = n(n− 1)(1− c). (.28)
On the other hand, the largest real eigenvalue λPF of a graph G with m edges is
bounded from above so that λPF ≤ 12 (
√
8m+ 1 − 1) (53) 22 . For the performance
of the system we then have
Π =
∑n
i=1 λPF(Gi)− 2mc
≤ nmax1≤i≤n λPF(Gi)− 2mc
≤ n2 (
√
8m+ 1− 1)− 2cm
=: b(n,m, c),
(.29)
with n ≤ m ≤ (n2). For fixed cost c and number of nodes n, the number of edges
maximizing Eq. (.29) is given by m∗ = n
2−c2
8c2 if
n2−c2
8c2 <
(
n
2
)
and m∗ = n(n−1)2 if
21The results on the relative error that we obtain later in this proof are still valid under this assumption.
22Notice that a similar result can be obtained using an alternative bound for connected graphs, λPF ≤√
2m− n + 1 due to (33)
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n2−c2
8c2 >
(n
2
)
. The graph with the latter number of edges is the complete graph Kn.
Inserting m∗ into Eq. (.29) yields
b(n,m∗, c) =
{
n
2 (
√
n2−c2
c2 + 1− 1)− n
2−c2
4c , if c >
n
2n−1 ,
n(n− 1)(1− c) = Π(Kn), if c < n2n−1 .
(.30)
The bound for c ≤ n2n−1 ∼ 12 coincides with the performance of the complete
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Fig. .1. Upper bound b(n,m∗, c) of Eq. (.30) for n = 100 and varying costs c. For c ≤ n2n−1 the upper
bound corresponds with the complete graph Kn.
graph, Kn which is therefore the efficient graph.
(iv) If c = n then the number of edges maximizing Eq. (.29) is given by m∗ = 0 and
the efficient graph is the empty graph K¯n.
Proof of Proposition (4) The three claims of the Proposition are addressed in se-
quence.
(i) With
∑
i di = 2m we can write the degree variance as follows
σ2d =
1
n
∑n
i=1
(
di − 2mn
)2 = 1n ∑ni=1 d2i − ( 2mn )2 . (.31)
Using then the fact that the graph Fn,d contains one node with degree n− 1 (the
hub), d − 1 nodes with degree d − 1 (those in the clique) and n − d nodes with
degree 1, we get
σ2d(Fn,d) =
1
n
(
(n− 1)2 + (d− 1)3 + (n− d))− (2m
n
)2
. (.32)
We now replace in the equation above the value of d that maximizes total profits for
the graph Fn,d, d = n+3c2c , as found from Equation (.23), as well as the corresponding
value of m, given by m(d) = n
2+8c2n−9c2
8c2 . As a result, one obtains the degree
variance and this expression is of quadratic order in n, σ2d = O(n2).
(ii) The coefficient of variation of the degree is defined as cv = σd/d¯. Recalling that the
average degree is d¯ = 2m/n and replacing, as above, the value of d that maximizes
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total profits, d = n+3c2c , and the corresponding value of m, one obtains an expression
in n and c. The limit of large n for this expression is well defined and equal to
lim
n→∞ cv =
√
(2c− 1). (.33)
(iii) (26) have shown that the degree variance of a random graph G(n,m) with n nodes
and m links is given by
σ2d(G(n,m)) =
2m(n2 − n− 2m)
n3 + n2
. (.34)
Replacing m as in (ii), the expression above turns out to be of order O(n), and
consistently, the ratio of (.32) and (.34) is of order O(n).
Proof of Proposition (5) Along an Improving Path the number m of links can vary,
in absolute value, only by one or zero. Here, we restrict ourselves to the Improving Paths
with number of links increasing from m1 = 0 to (possibly) m2 = n(n− 1)/2. Along any
of these Improving Path λPF(m) is a well defined one-valued function. Since the largest
eigenvalue is bounded, λPF(m) ≤ n − 1 (Prop. 1), the average increase of λPF(m) per
link added is 2n . The straight line in Figure 5 has slope
2
n and intersect the origin. Let
us now define ym = λPF(m) − 2nm. Since it is ym1 = 0 and ym2 = 0. It obviously holds
that the sum of the increments ∆ym = ym − ym−1 in I = [m1,m2] ∩N , has to be zero,
m2∑
m1+1
∆ym = 0. (.35)
However, along the Improving Path, ym starts off positive. For instance, starting from
an empty network, the first link added yields a pair (i.e. a path of length 2, P2 23 ), with
an eigenvalue λPF = 1, which yields ym = 1 − 2n > 0 for n > 2. If a second link is
added to one of the nodes of the pair, a path of three nodes is formed, with eigenvalue
λPF = 2 cos(pi/4) = 1.41 (see Table 1) and ym = 2 cos(pi/4) − 4n . Therefore, we can
always find an integer m3 ≥ 1, such that (1) ym3 = b > 0 and (2) I = I1 ∪ I2, with
I1 = [m1,m3] ∩ N and I2 = [m3,m2] ∩ N . The condition on the increments of y (.35)
implies that ∑
m∈I2
∆ym = −
∑
m∈I1
∆ym = −b (.36)
Denoting as 〈∆y〉I2 the average increment in the set I2, we have∑
m∈I2
∆ym = 〈∆y〉I2 (m2 −m3). (.37)
There must be some increments that are smaller or equal to average increment, hence
we obtain
∆ym∗ ≤ − bm2−m3 < 0 ∃m∗
or, equivalently,
∆λPF(m∗) < 2n ∃m∗.
(.38)
23The term path refers to a particular type of graph, see Section 2.1. The term Improving Path refers
to a sequence in the space of graphs, as defined earlier.
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Fig. .2. Number of stable clique sizes when the spanning star K1,n−1 is an equilibrium as well (for
α = 0.1 and α = 0.5). If this number is positive then we have a spanning star K1,n−1 and (at least one)
set of disconnected cliques K1k , ...,K
d
k as equilibrium networks for the same level of cost c.
For any given cost, we can find n large enough so that the marginal revenue is smaller
that the cost for some m∗. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition (6) If costs are zero, c = 0, then the change in eigenvalue equals
the change in payoff. Since (in a connected graph G) every created link strictly increases
λPF (34) and accordingly the payoff, the complete graph Kn is reached eventually.
Proof of Proposition (7) There exists the following bound on the change in eigenvalue
by the removal and creation of a link (16): If the graphs G,G′ differ in only one edge then
|λPF(G′)− λPF(G)| ≤ 1. A link is created if ∆λPF > c. Thus, no link is created if c = 1.
On the other hand, a link is removed, if ∆λPF < c′. And thus, all links are removed if
c′ > 1 and we obtain an empty graph K¯n.
Proof of Proposition (16) The structure of the Proof is as follows. We want to show
that the graph G consisting of k cliques of the same size is stable, that is no link is
removed or created. For the removal, we can focus on links between nodes in a same
clique, since these are the only links in G. Thus, in Proposition (13) we show that, for
any pair of nodes in a same clique, the link is not removed as long as the size of the
clique is smaller than a given bound br, n ≤ br = 0 2−c
′(1−c′)
c′ 1.
For the creation of links, we can focus on links between nodes in different cliques,
since these are the only new links that can be added to the graph. Thus, in Proposition
(14) we show that for any pair of firms belonging respectively to different cliques, a link
between them is not created as long as the size of the clique is larger than another bound
bc, n ≥ bc = . 1+c(1−c)c /. It turns out that the bound for the removal, br, is larger than
the bound for the creation, bc, for any value of c ∈ [0, 1], as it is shown in Figure (??).
However, since the size n of the clique has to be an integer, the interval [bc, br] needs to
contain at least one integer. This can be checked numerically. We explored the interval
c ∈ [0, 1] with a resolution of 10−3 and we counted the number of integer values that fall
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within [bc, br]. As it is shown in Figure (.2), for c < 0.35, there is always at least one
integer in between the two bounds, while for c < 0.2, there are always several integers
falling in between the two bounds.
This is a remarkable finding as it implies that for those values of cost, there is a
multiplicity of equilibria. Indeed for a given value of cost, the stable graphs are all the
configurations with cliques of the same size n, where n varies among the integers included
in the interval [bc, br].
This concludes the Proof of the Proposition. Propositions (16) and (13), used for this
Proof, are stated and provided below.
Proposition 13 Consider a clique Kn and denote by Kn − ij the graph obtained from
Kn by removing an edge ij. Then λPF(Kn)− λPF(Kn − ij) > c′ if n ≤ 0 2−c
′(1−c′)
c′ 1.
Proof of Proposition (13) Denote the matrix obtained from the adjacency matrix A
of Kn − ij, and subtracting the variable λ on the diagonal of A by M = A− λI. M is a
block matrix of the form
M =
K BT
B D
 , (.39)
with submatrices 24
K =

−λ 1 · · · · · · 1
1 −λ ...
...
. . .
...
. . . 1
1 · · · 1 −λ

(n−2)×(n−2)
, (.40)
B =
1 1 1 1 1 1 · · ·
1 1 1 1 1 1 · · ·

2×n
, (.41)
D =
−λ 0
0 −λ

2×2
. (.42)
Since M is a block-matrix (34) we can write
det(M) = det(K) det(P). (.43)
We have the following Lemma:
24The numbers at the bottom right of the matrix indicate the dimension of the matrix.
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Lemma 4
det

a 1 · · · · · · 1
1 a
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . . 1
1 · · · · · · 1 a

n×n
= ((n− 1) + a) (a− 1)n−1. (.44)
Proof of Lemma (4) The above determinant can be written as det (U− (1− a)I),
where U is a matrix consisting of all ones, uij = 1 i, j = 1, ..., n and I is the identity
matrix. Hence, the eigenvalues of the above matrix are minus 1− a the eigenvalues of U.
U has eigenvalues n and 0 with multiplicities 1 and n−1 respectively (34). Therefore, we
can write for the determinant (n− (1− a)) (0− (1 − a))n−1 = ((n− 1) + a) (a− 1)n−1.
Thus, we get for the determinant of K
detK = − ((n− 1)− λ) (1 + λ)n−1. (.45)
The Schur complement is P = D−BK−1BT . Multiplying the inverse of K with B from
the left and BT from the right we obtain
BK−1BT = ||K−1||1
1 1
1 1
 (.46)
where ||K−1||1 is the sum of all elements in the matrix K−1 (the l1 norm of the matrix
K−1 (34)). By computing K−1K = I one can verify that
K−1 =

n−4−λ
(λ−(n−3))(1+λ) − 1(λ−(n−3))(1+λ) · · ·
− 1(λ−(n−3))(1+λ)
. . .
...
 . (.47)
And, by summation over the elements in K−1, we obtain ||K−1||1 = n−2(n−3)−λ . Conse-
quently, the determinant of the Schur complement P is given by
det(P) = (1 + λ)n−3λ
(
λ2 − (n− 3)λ− 2(n− 2)) . (.48)
The largest real eigenvalue of Kn − ij is given by the root of
λ2 − (n− 3)λ− 2(n− 2) = 0. (.49)
Thus we get
λPF =
1
2
(
n− 3 +
√
n2 + 2n− 7
)
. (.50)
For the change in eigenvalue ∆λPF = λPF(Kn)− λPF(Kn − ij) we obtain
∆λPF =
1
2
(
n+ 1−
√
n2 + 2n− 7
)
, (.51)
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since λPF(Kn) = n− 1. This is a decreasing function in n. Then for n ∈ N, ∆λPF > c′ if
n ≤ 02− c
′(1 − c′)
c′
1. (.52)
For c′ = 2−√2 = 0.586 we have n ≤ 3 and for c′ = 1 we obtain n ≤ 2.
Proposition 14 Denote the graph consisting of two disconnected cliques by G and the
graph obtained from G by connecting the two cliques in G via an edge by G′. Then for
n ≥ . 1+c(1−c)c2 / we have λPF(G′)− λPF(G) < c.
Proof of Proposition (14) Denote the adjacency matrix of the graph obtained by
connecting two complete subgraphs Kn and Kn via and edge, see Figure (6), by A.
And denote the matrix obtained by subtracting the variable λ on the diagonal of A by
M = A− λI. The eigenvalues of A are given by the roots of the determinant of M. M
has the form of a block matrix with the submatrices K and B. We have
M =
 K B
BT K
 , (.53)
K =

−λ 1 · · · · · · 1
1 −λ ...
...
. . . 1
1 · · · 1 −λ

n×n
. (.54)
Due to the symmetry of the graph we can consider a matrix of the following form, where
we have put the one on the diagonal indicating the link between the cliques,
B =

0 · · · · · · 0
...
. . .
...
...
... 0
...
· · · 0 1 0 · · ·
... 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 · · · · · · 0

n×n
, (.55)
with the Schur complement
Q = K−BTK−1B. (.56)
For the determinant of M we have detM = det(K) det(Q). The determinant of K is
given by
det(K) = (1 + λ)n−3(λ− n+ 3). (.57)
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The inverse of K is already given in (.47) 25 . W.l.o.g. the Schur complement Q is given
by
Q =

−λ 1 · · · · · · 1
1 −λ ...
...
. . .
−λ 1
1 · · · · · · 1 −λ+ λ−(n−2)(λ−(n−1))(1+λ)

. (.58)
In the next step we make use of the following Lemma:
Lemma 5
det

b 1 · · · · · · 1
1 a
...
...
. . .
...
... a 1
1 · · · · · · 1 a

n×n
= (1− n + (n− 2)b + ab) (a− 1)n−2. (.59)
Proof of Lemma (5) We give a proof by induction. For n = 2 we get
det
b 1
1 a

2×2
= ab− 1 = (b(2− 2) + ab− (2− 1))(a− 1)0. (.60)
For n = 3 we get
det

b 1 1
1 a 1
1 1 a

3×3
= a2b− 2a+ 2− b = (b + ab− 2)(a− 1). (.61)
For the induction step we apply a Laplace expansion of the determinant in (.59) into
Minors.
b det

a 1 · · · · · · 1
1 a
...
...
. . .
...
... a 1
1 · · · · · · 1 a

(n−1)×(n−1)
− (n− 1) det

1 1 · · · · · · 1
1 a
...
...
. . .
...
... a 1
1 · · · · · · 1 a

(n−1)×(n−1)
(.62)
25Note that here the matrix K has dimension n× n
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For the first determinant we can use Lemma (4) and for the second the induction hy-
pothesis in order to obtain
b ((n− 2) + a) (a− 1)n−2 − (n− 1)(a− 1)n−2. (.63)
Now we can compute the determinant of the Schur complement Q
detQ = − (1− n + (n− 2)q − λq) (1 + λ)n−2 (.64)
q :=
−(n− 2) + λ
(−(n− 1) + λ)(1 + λ) − λ. (.65)
λPF is given by the largest root of detQ = 0. We obtain λPF = 12 (n−1+
√
n2 − 2n+ 5).
The change in the largest real eigenvalue is
∆λPF = 12 (n− 1 +
√
n2 − 2n+ 5)− (n− 1)
= 12 (1− n+
√
(n− 2)n+ 5),
(.66)
since λPF(Kn) = n− 1. Thus, ∆λPF < c if
n ≥ .1 + c(1− c)
c
/. (.67)
For costs c = 0.5 we get n ≥ 2 and for c = 1 we get n ≥ 1.
Proof of Proposition (9) In order to proof the stability of the spanning star K1,n−1
(connecting all nodes in the network), we have to consider two cases: (i) the creation of
a link and (ii) the removal of a link.
(i) We consider the creation of a link between the nodes in the star. The normalized
eigenvector associated with the largest real eigenvalue λPF is given by 12(n−1) (1, ..., 1,
√
n− 1, 1, ..., 1)T .
(42) found an upper bound for the largest real eigenvalue λPF and corresponding
eigenvector x of an undirected graph G if an edge ij is added
λPF(G + ij)− λPF(G) < 1 + δ − δ(1 + δ)(2 + δ)(xi + xj)2 + δ(2 + δ + 2xixj) , (.68)
where δ denotes the minimum degree in the graph G 26 . Applying Eq. (.68) to the
star K1,n−1 gives ∆λPF = λPF(K1,n−1 + ij)− λPF(K1,n−1) < 23−4n+2n2 . The link
ij is not created if ∆λPF < c or equivalently
n > 1 +
√
2− c
2c
. (.69)
This is a decreasing function in c. For c > 23 this means that n ≥ 3.
(ii) The change in eigenvalue by removing a link from K1,n−1 is given by ∆λPF =
λPF(K1,n−1) − λPF(K1,n−2) =
√
n− 1 − √n− 2. A link is not removed from the
star if ∆λPF > c′ or equivalently
2 < n <
1 + c′2(6 + c′2)
4c′2
. (.70)
26Equation (.68) is an upper bound and the number of stable stars derived from it may actually be
higher.
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Putting the bounds obtained in (i) and (ii) together we get the desired Proposition.
Proof of Proposition (11) A link between two disconnected firms is created if the
largest real eigenvalue of the connected component of the firms after the link is created
increases more then the cost, i.e. ∆λPF > c. Similarly an existing link is removed if the
largest real eigenvalue of the connected component of the firms after the link is removed
does not decrease more then the cost, i.e. |∆λPF| < c′ = αc. We therefore have to consider
the change in eigenvalue by the creation or removal of a link and compare it to the cost.
The proof of Proposition (11) is composed of two steps. (i) We show that in every
period t in the network formation process Γ(G) = G0, G1, ... the network Gt, t ≥ 1,
consists only of graphs from the set S = {∅, P2, P3, P4}, where ∅ denotes the set of
isolated nodes. (ii) We show that there exists a cycle, i.e. a sequence of repeatedly visited
graphs, C = (P2, {P2, P2}, P4, P3), in which each graph is an improvement over the
previous graph in the sequence C (36). Since all the graphs in the set S can be found
in the cycle C, starting from any of the graphs in S, the network formation process will
proceed to the next graph in the cycle C. Therefore, for the given values of α and cost
c, c′ respectively, we can infer that there does not exist a pairwise stable equilibrium
network.
(i) We give a proof by induction on the periods t ≥ 1 of the network formation process
Γ(G). The induction basis is period t = 1. The network G1 is obtained from the
empty network G0 (initial network) by the formation of a link and thus contains
only a P2 and isolated nodes, both graphs are contained in the set S. Now we assume
that the network at time t > 1 consist only of graphs in the set S (induction
hypothesis). The induction step consists in showing from Gt to Gt+1, no other
graphs than the ones in the set S will be created. This will conclude this part of
the proof. In order to prove the induction step, we observe that in the network
formation process Γ(G), at time t, a pair of nodes, say i and j, is selected at
random. Either i and j are already connected in Gt or they are not. In any case,
they both belong by assumption to one of the graphs in S. All the possible cases
can be grouped as follows.
(a) Both nodes are isolated. We show that the empty graph evolves into a P2. The
creation of a link between two isolated nodes results in ∆λPF = 1. Since by
assumption c < 1, the link is indeed created.
(b) At least one of the nodes, say i, is part of a P2. In this case, we show that the
only possible evolution step is from two P2 to one P4.
(i) Link creation. Figure (.3) shows all possible distinct graphs that can be
obtained depending on which graph belongs the second node, j, and in
which position. Each of these possible graphs is named with a number
in the following way. For instance, when j is in another P2, the possible
positions in that P2 result both in one same graph labelled as 1. When j
is in a P3, there are two possible distinct resulting graphs, labelled as 2.1
and 2.2. Similarly, we label the graphs resulting in the remaining case
that j is in a P4. Table (.1) report the increase of the largest eigenvalue of
the graph when the link is created in all the possible cases. For instance,
consider the graph 2.1 resulting from a P2 and a P3 with the creation of a
link. Before the creation of the link, node i is in a P2 which has λPF = 1
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and node j is in a P3 graph which has λPF =
√
2. Since the link formation
rule requires that both nodes will benefit after the creation of the link,
we have to consider the worst case for the initial graph, which means
the highest of the two values, i.e. λPF =
√
2 = 1.414. For the resulting
graph 2.1 we have λ′PF =
√
3 = 1.732, and therefore an increase of
eigenvalue ∆λPF = 0.318 which is smaller than the cost c = 0.586. It
follows that this link will not be created. After analyzing all the other
cases, we can see that only the case 1 results in an increase in the largest
real eigenvalue ∆λPF = 0.618 that is higher than the lower bound of the
cost c > 2 − √2 = 0.586. This implies that the only possible evolution
step at this point is the formation of one P4 starting from two P2. Notice
that P4 is in the set S.
P2
3.1
3.2
4
1 2.1
2.2
Fig. .3. All possible graphs for link creation when at least one of the selected nodes is part of a P2. We
have labeled all the possible cases or links respectively with numbers shown next to the dashed links.
1 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 4
λPF 1 1.414 1.618 1
λPF’ 1.618 1.732 1.848 1.802 1.932 1.414
∆λPF 0.618 0.318 0.434 0.184 0.314 0.414
Table .1
Change in eigenvalue for link creation when at least one of the selected nodes is part of a P2. The
numbers in the first row in the table refer to the possible links indicated by the same numbers in
Figure (.3). The maximum increase in the largest real eigenvalue is given by the creation of a link
between the two pairs, indicated by 1 in Figure (.3).
(ii) Link deletion. A link is deleted if this beneficial to at least one of the
two firms concurrent to the link, or, equivalently, if |∆λPF| < c′ = cα. In
the case we are considering, by assumption at least one of the nodes is
in a P2 and we examine the deletion of a link. This implies that the two
nodes form a P2, which has λPF = 1. The deletion of the link implies
to evolve into an empty graph which has λPF = 0, yielding |∆λPF| = 1.
Since, by assumption we have that c > 2−√2, the case of cα > 1 implies
that the link is removed only if α > 1
2−√2 = 1.707. But we have assumed
that α ∈ [0, 1] and therefore the link is not removed.
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(c) At least one of the nodes is part of a P3. In this case, we show that if α ∈
[0.707, 1] then the only possible evolution step is from one P3 to one P2 and
one isolated node.
(i) Link creation. Figure (.4) shows all possible graphs that can be obtained
by adding a link when at least one of the selected nodes is part of a P3.
Table (.2) shows the increase in eigenvalue for all these possible graphs.
From the Table we can see that in none of the cases the increase in
eigenvalue is higher than the lower bound of the cost. Thus, no link is
created.
P3
3.1
3.2
3.3 3.4
1.1
1.3
1.2 1.4 2.1
2.3
2.2
2.4
4.2
4.1
P3
5
Fig. .4. All possible cases for link creation when at least one of the selected nodes is part of a P3. We
have labeled all the possible cases or links respectively with numbers shown next to the dashed links.
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
λPF 1.414
λPF’ 1.732 1.848 1.732 1.848
∆λPF 0.318 0.434 0.318 0.434
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
λPF 1.414
λPF’ 1.902 1.802 2 1.902
∆λPF 0.488 0.388 0.586 0.488
3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4
λPF 1.618
λPF’ 1.848 2 1.932 2.053
∆λPF 0.23 0.382 0.314 0.435
4.1 4.2 5
λPF 1.414
λPF’ 1.732 1.618 2
∆λPF 0.318 0.204 0.586
Table .2
Change in eigenvalue for link creation when at least one of the selected nodes is part of a P3. The
numbers in the first row in the table refer to the possible links indicated by the same numbers in Fig-
ure (.4). The maximum increase in the largest real eigenvalue is given by the creation of a triangle,
indicated by 5 in Figure (.4). However, does not exceed the minimum value of cost c ≥ 0.586 and so
the corresponding firms do not form this link.
(ii) Link deletion. The removal of a link from P3 results in a change in
eigenvalue of ∆λPF =
√
2 − 1 = 0.414. The lower bound for the cost
is c > 2 − √2. We have that |∆λPF| ≤ c′ = αc if α ≥
√
2−1
2−√2 = 0.707.
Therefore, if we restrict the values of α to the interval [0.707, 1] then
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the link is removed and we obtain a single connected pair P2 and one
isolated node. Both are contained in the set of graphs {∅, P2, P3, P4}.
(d) At least one of the nodes is part of a P4. In this case, we show that if α ∈
[0.707, 1] then the only possible evolution step is from one P4 to one P3 and
an isolated node.
(i) Link creation. Figure (.5) shows the possible graphs that can be obtained
by adding a link when at least one of the selected nodes is part of a
P4. Table (.2) shows the corresponding increase in eigenvalue. From the
Table we can see that in none of the cases the increase in eigenvalue is
higher than the lower bound of the cost. Thus, no link is created.
P4
3.1
3.2 3.3
3.4
1.1
1.2
2.1
2.2 2.3
2.4
4.2
4.1
P4
5.1
5.2
Fig. .5. All possible cases for link creation when at least one of the selected nodes is part of a P4.
1.1 1.2
λPF 1.618
λPF’ 1.802 1.932
∆λPF 0.184 0.314
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
λPF 1.618
λPF’ 1.970 1.848 2.053 1.932
∆λPF 0.352 0.23 0.435 0.314
3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4
λPF 1.618
λPF’ 1.879 1.989 1.989 2.095
∆λPF 0.261 0.371 0.371 0.477
4.1 4.2
λPF 1.618
λPF’ 1.848 1.732
∆λPF
5.1 5.2
λPF 1.618
λPF’ 2.170 2
∆λPF 0.552 0.382
Table .3
Change in eigenvalue for link creation when at least one of the selected nodes is part of a P4.
(ii) Link deletion. The change in eigenvalue is either (A) ∆λPF = 0.204 if
the first or last link in P4 is removed or (B) it is ∆λPF = 0.618 if the
second link in the middle of P4 is removed.
In case (A) the change in eigenvalue is given by ∆λPF =
√
2− 12 (1 +√
5). If c′ = αc ≥ √2 − 12 (1 +
√
5), then |∆λPF| ≤ c′ = αc and the
link is removed. This means that, for c > 2 − √2 we must have that
α ≥ |
√
2− 12 (1+
√
5)|
2−√2 = 0.348 which is certainly true since we have assumed
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that α ≥
√
2−1
2−√2 = 0.707. Thus, the link is removed under the above
made assumptions on cost and α and we obtain a path of length three,
P3, which is in the set of graphs {∅, P2, P3, P4}.
In case (B) we have that ∆λPF = 1− 12 (1+
√
5). This link is removed
for |∆λPF| ≤ c′ = cα implying that α ≥ |1−
1
2 (1+
√
5)|
2−√2 = 1.055. Since we
have assumed that α ∈ [0, 1] this cannot be true. Therefore, the link is
not removed.
Notice that in all the cases the graphs created belong to the set S, as we
wanted to prove.
(ii) From the preceding analysis we can infer two facts: First, the individual profits of
the firms involved in the creation or removal of a link always increase along the
closed sequence of graphs C = (P2, {P2, P2}, P4, P3.P2), as it is illustrated in Figure
(8). Therefore, this is an Improving Path (36) which is cyclical and never stops.
Notice that, the firms responsible for the creation or deletion of the links along the
sequence are different and individual profits of a given firm are not increasing at
every step. Along the Improving Path, the individual profits of the firms involved
in the link creation or removal increase, while the profits of the others may de-
crease. This highlights the effects of the externalities inherent in our model on the
individual profits of the firms.
Second, since at every step of the sequence there is only one possible network
evolution step and since all the non-empty graphs of the set S are also in the
cycle C, we can conclude that C is the only Improving Path in the given range of
parameters.
Proof of Proposition (12) The change in the largest real eigenvalue, ∆λPF of a graph
G with m edges and n nodes, by adding one edge to the graph is bounded by
∆λPF ≤ 12(−1 +
√
1 + 8(m+ 1))− 2m
n
. (.71)
The above inequality can be obtained as follows. The average degree of the graph is
d¯ = 2mn . A lower bound on the largest real eigenvalue is given by λPF ≥ d¯ (17). An
upper bound on the largest real eigenvalue is given by λPF ≤ 12 (−1 +
√
1 + 8m) (53).
Combining the two bounds yields the inequality in (.71).
We apply the bound of Equation (.71) on the change in the largest real eigenvalue,
∆λPF, by adding an edge to the graphG with m edges. Solving the equation∆λPF = c for
m yields the maximal number m∗ of edges that can be added to a graph of n nodes when
the cost is c, m∗(n, c) = n4 (−1 − 2c + n +
√
n2 + 9− 2n(1 + 2c)). Notice that m∗(n, c)
decreases with increasing cost c. Imposing now this expression to be equal to one edge less
than the number of edges in a complete graph Kn with n nodes,
(n
2
)−1 = n(n−1)2 −1, we
get c∗ = 2n . Thus, if costs exceed this value then the increase in eigenvalue corresponding
to the creation of the link that would make the graph complete, is smaller than the cost.
Notice that c∗ decreases with n and tends to 0 for large n, as plotted in Fig. (.6), and
therefore for any given c there is an n large enough such that the complete graph cannot
be reached.
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0 10 20 30 40 500
0.5
1
1.5
2
n
c∗ "Kn
Fig. .6. Maximal value of cost c for which the complete graph Kn can be obtained as an equilibrium
network.
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